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The Supreme Court has frequently, and erroneously, hypothesized an individual
entrepreneur as the employer for the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act
('NLRA). Most employees work for corporations. Neither shareholders nor direc-
tors control the management of large corporations. Many corporate law scholars
have concluded that employees constitute a constituency entitled to participate in
corporate governance. That participation could be established for large corporations
in a federal statute requiring their incorporation under that law. An alternative is en-
largement of the area in which bargaining is required under the NLRA either by
amendment of the NLRA or by reconsideration of the scope of bargaining required by
the Act. Congressional enactment of plant closing legislation provides an occasion
and need for such reconsideration.
I. INTRODUCTION
There are, as a moment of consideration assures, many types of employers in
the United States. They vary not only in the size and composition of their work
forces, but also in legal structure. They may be corporations, partnerships, or in-
dividual proprietorships. Corporations may be subsidiaries of a holding company
engaged in what is identifiable as a unified undertaking, such as that of producing
* Professor of Law, University of Washington School of Law. The author wishes to acknowledge receipt of a
summer research grant from the University of Washington School of Law which aided in the writing of this ar-
ticle.
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automobiles or steel, or divisions of a conglomerate with diversified and unrelated
interests. Corporations may have stock which is publicly traded and held by many
stockholders, held by a single stockholder, or closely held by a family or small
group. They may be bound to other corporations by other means, such as licens-
ing and franchising agreements, by financing or banking arrangements or other
control devices.1
II. THE ASSUMPTION THAT EMPLOYERS ARE INDIVIDUAL ENTREPRENEURS
Numerous decisions of the Supreme Court under the National Labor Relations
Act reflect an assumption that American employers are individual proprietors and
entrepreneurial capitalists of the type associated with the end of the nineteenth
century. The assumption seems to be that those in charge of a business wisely and
prudently amassed enough capital to create the business, provide the plant and
equipment, and thus provide jobs for the employees represented by a union.
An example of this entrepreneurial capitalist employer concept is provided by a
Supreme Court decision which holds that there is no violation of the National La-
bor Relations Act when an employer terminates its entire business to avoid bar-
gaining with a union of its employees.2 Justice Harlan, writing for a unanimous
Court, stated:
A proposition that a single businessman cannot choose to go out of business if he
wants to would represent such a startling innovation that it should not be entertained
without the clearest manifestation of legislative intent or unequivocal judicial prece-
dent so construing the Labor Relations Act.
Of course, Roger Milliken, who controlled Deering Milliken, which in turn con-
trolled the employer, Darlington Manufacturing Company, was one of the few
businessmen who bore a resemblance to a nineteenth century entrepreneurial cap-
italist at the time of the decision. But the Court's holding in that case applies to all
employment relationships, including many corporate employers having none of
the characteristics of an individual entrepreneurial capitalist. This decision has
had drastic consequences for employees, many of whom may have made a much
greater contribution to their employing enterprise than the stockholders or man-
agers. The holding does, however, fit well with what is becoming an outmoded
concept of "scientific management," developed by Professor Frederick Taylor at
the beginning of this century. Pursuant to Taylor's analysis, management should
do all the thinking and employees should only perform the work assigned.' They
have no right to be involved in deciding whether their employment must come to
an end.
1. See A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 171-72 (1976).
2. Textile Workers Union v. Darlington Mfg. Co., 380 U.S. 263, 273-74 (1965).
3. Id. at 270 (emphasis added). Elsewhere the Court said: "We hold that so far as the Labor Relations Act is
concerned, an employer has the absolute right to terminate his business for any reason he pleases .... "Id. at
268 (emphasis added).
4. See Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and Emerging Possibilities, 55 U.
Chi. L. Rev. 73, 139-47 (1988).
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Putting the question in terms of a single businessman who wants to go out of
business raises concerns about individual freedom and the threat of a remedy
which would involve some aspects of involuntary servitude. Those concerns
would disappear if the question were viewed as one of whether those in charge of a
corporation must consider the cost of compensating employees for the losses they
will suffer if the assets of that corporation are to be liquidated because of a corpo-
rate unwillingness to comply with national labor policy.
The Court has shown little inclination to view the problems of corporate em-
ployers realistically. The disbelief that "a single businessman cannot go out of
business if he wants to" played an important part in a 1989 decision where the Su-
preme Court held that the Railway Labor Act's provisions governing major dis-
putes were inapplicable to a railroad corporation's decision to proceed with a sale
of its business. ' Employees affected by the sale did not receive the protections of
the Act even though it was known that the sale would result in the loss of employ-
ment for two-thirds of the work force.
Early in the development of NLRA law the concept of the employer as an indi-
vidual entreprenuer, guarding a personal investment, assisted the Supreme Court
in establishing the right of all employers to replace economic strikers perma-
nently.6 That rule has been of monumental importance because an employee's abil-
ity to strike only at the risk of losing his or her job fundamentally affects the
bargaining power of all employers and unions. Justice Roberts, speaking for a
unanimous Court, stated:
Although § 13 provides, "Nothing in this Act shall be construed so as to interfere
with or impede or diminish in any way the right to strike," it does not follow that an
employer, guilty of no act denounced by the statute, has lost the right to protect and
continue his business by supplying places left vacant by strikers. And he is not bound
to discharge those hired to fill the places of strikers, upon the election of the latter to
resume their employment, in order to create places for them.7
Again, the assumption that the employer was an individual who had created his
business produced a reluctance to require him to take back employees whose con-
duct has endangered him as well as his business. The reality was that the em-
ployer, Mackay Radio, was a public utility with offices throughout the United
5. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R.R. Co, v. Railway Labor Executives Ass'n, 491 U.S. 490, 507-08 (1989). The
railroad, described as a small rail carrier, had 750 employees prior to the sale, and the purchaser planned to use
only 250 employees. It was, however, a sufficiently substantial business to remain in operation after losing $60
million during the preceeding five years. Id. at 494-95. As Justice White stated, the employees had no reason to
expect, simply from the railroad's long existence, that it would stay in business, particularly if suffering losses.
Id. at 507. However, a total lack of concern for the investment made by employees during that long existence is
manifest in his statement that after the sale the railroad would no longer be a railroad employer and therefore
would have no need for services of members of the rail unions. See id. at 509.
6. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Tele. Co., 304 U.S. 333 (1938). The statement was dictum because the Board
had conceded, at least far the purposes of the case, that the employer had a right to hire permanent replacements.
See id. at 347. The Board's successful argument was that the employer unlawfully discriminated among the em-
ployees it reinstated on the basis of their strike activities. See id. at 350.
7. Id. at 345-46 (emphasis added).
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States and in foreign countries, and it was its status as a public utility which pro-
vided the basis for the employer's argument that it had a duty to find permanent
replacements for the strikers.'
In many other decisions involving the National Labor Relations Act the Court
has spoken of the employer as being an individual concerned about his property
and his business. That rationale was expressly stated by Chief Justice Hughes in
holding that a corporate employer did not violate the NLRA when it discharged
employees who participated in a "sit-down" strike.' Other decisions involved the
right of an employer to forbid distribution of union literature by nonemployees,"0
to subcontract for work previously performed by employees, 1' to communicate to
employees views concerning unionism and its potential effect upon a business,12
or to layoff or lockout employees to bring economic pressure in support of a bar-
gaining position.'" The concept of the employer as an individual likewise has
made an appearance in the Court's consideration of other problems such as deter-
mination of the obligations of a successor corporate employer of considerable size
8. See Note, Replacement of Workers During Strikes, 75 YALE L.J. 630, 631-32 (1966) (in which it is pointed
out that the rule was stated only as dictum concerning an issue first raised in a reply brief filed in the Supreme
Court).
9. See NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U.S. 240 (1939). The Chief Justice wrote: "This conduct
on the part of the employees manifestly gave good cause for their discharge unless the National Labor Relations
Act abrogates the right of the employer to retain in his employ those who illegally take and hold possession of his
property." Id. at 252 (emphasis added).
10. "It is our judgment, however, that an employer may validly post his property against nonemployee distri-
bution of union literature if reasonable efforts by the union through other channels of communications will enable
it to reach the employers with its message . . . . .NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 112 (1956)
(emphasis added).
11. "[T]he Company merely replaced existing employees with those of an independent contractor to do the
same work under similar conditions of employment. Therefore, to require the employer to bargain about the mat-
ter would not significantly abridge his freedom to manage the business." Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v.
NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 213 (1964) (emphasis added).
In his concurring opinion, which later provided the basis for limiting the obligation of employers to bargain
about subcontracting decisions, Justice Stewart objected to passages in the majority opinion which seemed to im-
ply "that any issue which may reasonably divide an employer and his employees" must be a subject for collective
bargaining. Id. at 221 (emphasis added). Later he did refer to an employer using the neuter pronoun "it". Id.
12. "Thus, aii employer is free to communicate to his employees any of his general views about unionism or
any of his specific views about a particular union . . . . He may even make a prediction as to the precise effects
he believes unionization will have on his company . . . . " NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 618
(1969). But an employer, who has control over that relationship and therefore knows it best, cannot be heard to
complain that he is without an adequate guide for his behavior. He can easily make his views known without
engaging in 'brinkmanship' . . . . "Id. at 620 (emphasis added).
13. "The question presented is . . . whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice . . . when he tem-
porarily lays off or 'locks out' his employees during a labor dispute to bring economic pressure in support of his
bargaining position." American Ship Bldg. Co. v. NLRB, 380 U.S. 300, 301-02 (1965) (citation omitted) (em-
phasis added).
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or the benefits which may be used to obtain replacements for strikers.14 It has car-
ried over to determination of the burden of proof in suits under Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act.15
The Court has upon occasion referred to an employer as "it." It did so in the
decisions which established the important classifications of mandatory and per-
missive subjects of bargaining,16 employer freedom from the duty to bargain about
shutting down a business for purely economic reasons,' 7 and the prohibition of un-
ilateral changes in conditions of employment prior to a bargaining impasse. 8 The
use of the neuter pronoun when discussing a corporation's obligation to bargain is
a commendable acceptance of reality considering that the words of section 8(a)(5)
of the National Labor Relations Act, which state the employer's obligation as one
of bargaining, "collectively with the representatives of his employees."19
This judicial tendency to speak of employers as male individuals is not limited
to the United States Supreme Court. A current and important development in an-
other area of employment law is the revision of the common law rule that a con-
tract of employment for an indefinite period of time is a contract terminable at the
will of either party for any reason, good or bad. That rule appeared in the United
States at the end of the nineteenth century, and is generally viewed as a develop-
ment well adapted to serve the needs of the new and growing industrial economy.20
In recent years state supreme courts have recognized exceptions to the rule which
14. "A potential employer may be willing to take over a moribund business only if he can make changes in
corporate structure, composition of the labor force, work location, task assignment, and nature of supervi-
sion .... "NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272, 287-88 (1972) (emphasis added).
There will be instances in which it is perfectly clear that the new employer plans to retain all of the em-
ployees in the unit and in which it will be appropriate to have him initially consult with the employees'
bargaining representative before he fixes terms. In other situations, however, it may not be clear that the
successor employer has hired his full complement of employees that he has a duty to bargain with a union,
since it will not be evident until then ....
Id. at 294-95 (emphasis added).
In NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221 (1963), Justice White stated that the question to be decided was
"whether an employer commits an unfair labor practice . . . when he extends a 20-year seniority credit to strike
replacements and strikers who leave the strike and return to work." Id. at 221-22 (emphasis added).
For other examples see Justice Harlan's concurring and dissenting opinion in NLRB v. Burnup & Sims, Inc.,
379 U.S. 21, 24 (1964), and Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424
U.S. 554, 572-73 (1976).
15. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642,652, 656-57, 659-60 (1989); Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440, 450 (1982). See also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 228 (1977) (involving the consti-
tutionality of an agency shop agreement in public employment).
16. NLRB v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 343, 349 (1958).
17. First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666,667 (1981). However, the Court quoted the lan-
guage of Textile Workers v. Darlington Manufacturing Co., 380 U.S. 263, 268 (1965), establishing "the right to
terminate his business." Id. at 677.
18. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 737 (1962). At a later point, however, Justice Brennan returned to discus-
sing an employer's bargaining obligations as those of a male individual. See id. at 745. He did so even though the
respondents were partners doing business as Williamsburg Steel Products Company. See id. at 739.
19. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988).
20. Blades, Employment At Will v. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67
COLUM. L. REv. 1404, 1416-19 (1967); Blumrosen, Employer Discipline: U.S. Report, 18 RunrERs L. REv. 428,
432-33 (1964); Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time For A Statute, 62 VA. L. REv.
481,484-86 (1976); Comment, A Common Law Action for the Abusively Discharged Employee, 26 HASTINGs L.J.
1434, 1440-41 (1975).
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vary in breadth and significance.21 Perhaps because plaintiffs seeking to establish
exceptions to the rule of employment-at-will frequently argue that changes in eco-
nomic conditions affecting employment justify recognition of an exception, state
courts have not frequently assumed that employers are male entrepreneurial capi-
talists, as has the United States Supreme Court.22 However, some courts do make
such an erroneous assumption.
Thus, in refusing to adopt an exception to the employment-at-will rule for bad
faith terminations of employment in a case involving a large corporation, the Su-
preme Court of Washington said: "An employer's interest in running his business
as he sees fit must be balanced against the interest of the employee in maintaining
his employment .... "23
In its decision rejecting the implication of a covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing, the Supreme Court of North Dakota stated its agreement with the policies and
reasoning of the Supreme Court of Washington, quoting the Washington Court's
concern for an employer's interest in running "his" business.24 The Maryland
Court of Appeals likewise used the male pronoun when discussing the interest of a
corporate employer in discharging an at-will employee." The Iowa Supreme
Court, denying the claim of an employee who had failed to establish that her cor-
porate employer had violated a public policy of the state, stated that, "[a]s a gen-
eral rule, an employer should be able to employ who he wants."2"
Professor Richard Epstein made a similar assumption that employers are indi-
vidual owners in his frequently discussed defense of the employment-at-will rule.
He assures his readers that while the employer who decides to act for a bad reason
or no reason at all may not face any consequences under the common law rule, "he
faces powerful adverse economic consequences."27 "[T]he employer must always
pay an implicit price when he exercises his right to fire.'28 Epstein thus unrealisti-
cally assumes that decisions to terminate employment are made by individual em-
ployers with a pocketbook interest in the matter. That assumption of individual
and personal financial involvement of the decision maker appears throughout his
21. The theoretical bases for the exceptions fall into three categories: (1) implied contractual obligations of
the employer implied from statements made during the hiring process or found in employee personnel manuals;
(2) an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (3) prohibitions of discharges which are contrary to
public policy because they are based on employee refusals to violate a law or employee assertion of rights pro-
vided by law. A quick reference source for state by state developments is available in J9A Individual Employment
Rights] Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 505:1-911.
22. See e.g., Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 176-77, 319 A.2d 174, 176 (1974).
23. Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash. 2d 219, 227, 685 P.2d 1081, 1086 (1984) (emphasis
added).
24. Hillesland v. Federal Land Bank Ass'n, 407 N.W2d 206,214 (N.D. 1987).
25. Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290 Md. 615,432 A.2d 464 (1981).
26. Albrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, Inc., 270 N.W.2d 454, 456 (1978) (emphasis added).
27. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 947,968 (1984).
28. Id. at 973 (emphasis added).
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article.29 The same assumptions concerning the employment relation were carried
over to his critique of New Deal legislation.3 His former colleague, Judge Posner,
makes a similar assumption in beginning his discussion of corporations and the
nature of the firm.31 Their approaches confirm the accuracy of Galbraith's obser-
vation:
In teaching and theoretical model-building, the modern large corporation is ig-
nored. An entrepreneur is assumed. To 'most economists, even today, the 'entrepre-
neur' still means only the owner-manager, usually by implication, of a small
maufacturing business.'32
Judicial predilection to think of corporate employers as though they were hu-
man beings has been longstanding. The Supreme Court made the momentous de-
cision that corporations are persons for the purposes of the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment without hearing argument on the question because
all of the Justices were of the opinion the equal protection clause applied to corpo-
rations."3 And the Supreme Court has with remarkably little argument extended
the concept of corporate personhood by conferring on corporations constitutional
protections of freedom of speech, liberty, and power of contracting .3
29. Id. at 947-48, 954, 963. Epstein states for example that the basic position was well set out in a passage
from an 1884 decision of the Supreme Court of Tennessee, Payne v. Western & AtLI. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 518-19
(1884):
[M]en must be left, without interference to buy and sell where they please, and to discharge or retain em-
ployees at will for good cause or for no cause, even for bad cause without thereby being guilty of an un-
lawful act per se. It is a right which an employee may exercise in the same way, to the same extent, for the
same cause or want of cause as the employer.
51 U. CHI. L. REV. at 947-48. That case did not involve the discharge of an employee, but Epstein later confirms
that his approach to employment law is that two individuals bargain about how the product of their joint efforts
will be divided: "In the employment-contracting situation, the employer is the sole residual claimant upon the
earnings of the firm, while the employee receives a fixed wage." 51 U. CHI. L. REv. at 963.
30. Epstein, A Common Law for Labor Relations: A Critique of the New Deal Labor Legislation, 92 YALE L.J.
1357 (1983). "Becoming an employer or an employee is strictly a private act in which one person decides to offer
his own capital in exchange for the services of another individual, or vice versa, on whatever terms the parties to
the exchange see fit."92 YALE L.J. at 1366. "At the common law, the employer, like everyone else, was entitled to
the exclusive possession and use of his own property." 92 YALE L.J. at 1388. "In its early decisions, the Labor
Board found that any speech by an employer designed to induce its employees to stay out of the union was coer-
cive and improper. In particular, special and vigorous condemnation was found for speeches in which the em-
ployer stated that he would bargain hard against the union, close his shop and move elsewhere, or eliminate some
of the benefits to which his employees had grown accustomed." 92 YALE L.J. at 1389.
31. R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 289 (2d ed. 1977). In one, the entrepreneur contracts with one
person to supply the component parts, with another to assemble them, and with a third to sell the finished prod-
uct. In the second method he hires them to perform these tasks as his employees under his direction. Posner does,
however, quickly give recognition to the separation of ownership and control in the modern corporation. Id. at
300-03.
32. J.K. GALBRAITH, THE NEw INDUSTRIAL STATE 121 (1967) (quoting R.A. GORDON, BUSINESS LEADERSHIP
IN THE LARGE CORPORATION I1 (1945))[hereinafter GALBRAITH].
33. Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886).
34. M.J. HoRwITZ, SANTA CLARA REvISTED: THE DEVELOPMENT OF CORPORATE THEORY, in Samuels &
Miller, Corporations and Society: Power and Responsibility 13-63 (1987); J.J. FLYNN, THE JURISPRUDENCE OF
CORPORATE PERSONHOOD: THE M IISUSE OF A LEGAL CONCEPT, in SAMUELS & MILLER, supra, at 132-59.
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III. FACTS ABOUT EMPLOYERS AND EMPLOYMENT
As of the end of 1987 the American work force consisted of slightly over 122
million persons, of whom over 110 million worked in non-agricultural indus-
tries." Census Bureau statistics on private employment of course exclude govern-
ment employees, and in addition exclude railroad employees and the
self-employed. As of 1985, twenty-seven percent of all such privately employed
persons worked in units employing under twenty employees; accordingly, seventy-
three percent of all employees worked in units of twenty or more employees; forty-
four percent of those private employees worked in units of 100 or more employees;
and thirteen percent worked in units of 1000 or more employees.36
In 1984 the Internal Revenue Service received over sixteen million business re-
turns, of which over eleven million were from individual proprietorships, 1.6 mil-
lion were from partnerships, and over three million were from corporations. 7 The
total receipts of the individual proprietorships constituted but 5.9% of the total
business receipts, 8 making it obvious that individual proprietorships do not play a
substantial role in the American non-agricultural economy. The total receipts of
partnerships were but 4.3 % of total business receipts,39 indicating that the role of
partnerships in the American economy is even less than that of individual proprie-
torships. Total receipts of corporations in 1984 constituted 79.4 % of all business
receipts reported to the Internal Revenue Service. Obviously, most business done
in the United States is done by corporations.
In 1984 the Internal Revenue Service received 3.2 million corporate returns, of
which 2.7 million were from corporations with receipts of less than $1 million;
those receipts were but 7.6% of total corporate receipts. Corporations with re-
ceipts of $1 million or more received 92.4 % of total corporate receipts." It thus
appears that despite their large number, small corporations with limited receipts
do not do a significant part of the business done by corporations in the United
States.
However, there is great variation in the proportion of business done by smaller
corporations within the various categories of economic activity. Thus, in 1984
corporations with assets of less than $10 million received only 14.9 % of the man-
ufacturing receipts; corporations of that size received only 12.5 % of the receipts
of transportation companies and public utilities.41 But corporations of that small
size received 68.8 % of the receipts for services and 72.6 % of the receipts of cor-
35. Monthly Labor Review, Feb., 1988, Table 4, p. 86.
36. U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1988499, table 831 (108th ed. 1987).
Government employees, railroad employees, and self-employed persons are excluded from the calculations.
37. U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1988 495, table 823 (108th ed. 1987).
38. Total business receipts in 1984 were $8,752,000, of which proprietorship receipts were only $516 billion.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988495, table 823 (108th ed. 1987).
39. Partnership receipts were $375 billion whereas total business receipts were, as stated above, $8,752,000.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract ofthe United States: 1988 495, table 823 (108th ed. 1987).
40. U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1988495, table 824 (108th ed. 1987).
41. U.S. Bureau of the Census, StatisticalAbstract of the United States: 1988 507, table 848 (108th ed. 1987).
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porations engaged in construction.42 Large corporations with assets of over $250
million received well more than half of the receipts in manufacturing, finance (in-
cluding insurance and real estate), mining, and transportation and public utili-
ties."' Even larger manufacturing corporations with assets of over $1 billion
received 69 % of the profits from manufacturing in 1984," and they made approx-
imately 90 % of the sales of manufacturing corporations."S
As long ago as 1967 Galbraith pointed out that blue collar employment was no
longer continuing to grow despite the increase in the entire labor force.' Since that
time, due in part to foreign competition, employment in basic industries and man-
ufacturing was further reduced.47 It is common knowledge that the proportion of
persons employed in performance of services has been growing for a number of
years.' In 1985, 26.6% of all private employees (excluding those employed by
railroads) were engaged in providing services." a Of those so engaged, almost 30 %
worked in units of less than twenty employees; 54 % worked in units of less than
100 employees; and only 22% worked in units of more than 500 employees.50
Thus, while almost one quarter of the employees engaged in performing services
are employed by fairly large employers, a substantial proportion of the service em-
ployees work in relatively small units.
This is not to say that all persons so employed work under such conditions that
an intimate or personal working relationship with their employer is assured. Small
units of employment may be corporations controlled by a another superior entity
that supervises the personnel and labor policies of its subsidiaries.5 ' Thus, in 1982
the ten largest service corporations had a total of 438 and an average of 48.7 sub-
sidiaries, and the ten largest retail corporations had a total of 195 and an average of
42. Id.
43. Id. The exact figures are 68.2 % for manufacturing, 71.6% for finance, 55.9 % for mining, and 79.5 % for
transportation and public utilities.
44. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988 513, table 858 (108th ed. 1987).
45. In 1984 the IRS received 287 returns from corporations with assets of $1 billion or more. In 1984 the 300
largest industrial corporations made 92.4% of the sales of industrial corporations. U.S. Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988 513, tables 858-59 (108th ed. 1987).
46. GALBRAITH, supra note 32, at 236-37.
47. In 1970 there were 19,360,000 employees engaged in manufacturing; in 1986 there were only
18,990,000 manufacturing employees. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988
380, table 631 (108th ed. 1987).
48. In 1970 there were 11,390,000 employees engaged in providing services; in 1986 there were 22,531,000
employees so engaged. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988 380, table 63 1
(108thed. 1987).
49. Of the 8 1.1 million persons employed (excluding government, railroad, and self-employed), 21.5 million
were employed in providing services. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1988
499, table 832 (108th ed. 1987).
50. Id.
51. The introductory note to the section of the 1988 Statistical Abstract states:
A firm is generally defined as a business organization under a single management and may include one or
more establishments (i.e., a single physical location at which business is conducted) . ...
The IRS concept of a business firm relates primarily to the legal entity used for tax reporting purposes.
The IRS Statistics of Incorne reports present data, based on a sample of tax returns before audit . . . . A
corporation is a business that is legally incorporated under State laws.
U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988 493 (108th ed. 1987).
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19.5 subsidiaries. 2 Licensing and franchising agreements may also include provi-
sions affecting conditions of employment of these small units.
A similar distribution of employees is found in other classifications of employ-
ment. Thus, in construction 40% of the employees work in units of less than
twenty employees and 74% work in units of less than 100 employees; in the com-
bined fields of retail and wholesale trades, 37 % of the employees work in units of
less than twenty employees, and 78 % work in units of less than 100 employees; in
the combined fields of agricultural services, forestry and fisheries, 58% of the
employees work in units of less than twenty employees, and 83 % work in units of
less than 100 employees. 3
The distribution of employees in manufacturing, finance and insurance, and
transportation (excluding railroads) is almost a reverse model of the employment
just described. Thus, persons working in manufacturing units of less than twenty
employees constitute only 7.3 % of manufacturing employees; only 16.6% of the
employees in transportation, and only 29.5 % of the employees in finance and in-
surance work in units of less than twenty employees. 5 In manufacturing 72 % of
the employees work in units of 100 or more employees, and 26% work in units of
more than 1000 employees; 56 % of the employees in transportation work in units
of over 100 employees, and 20 % work in units of over 1000; 42 % of the employ-
ees in finance and insurance work in units of 100 or more employees, and 13%
work in units of more than 1000 employees.55
It thus appears that in some sectors of the economy, company size is compatible
with the concept of the employer as an entrepreneurial capitalist who has risked
personal assets and endeavours to produce the business which he or she controls.
In most sectors of the economy, however, the concept does not fit so well with the
facts that it should be the model on which labor relations law is built. Manufactur-
ing, which employs 24 % of the private workforce, 6 is a sector in which the con-
cept is actually misleading. As the statistics presented above establish, even in
service industries, which provide slightly more than one quarter of private em-
ployment and are probably most compatible with the concept of the employer as an
entrepreneurial capitalist, almost half of the persons employed work in units of
100 or more employees. Employment units of that size are probably operated by
corporations of a fairly substantial size. And, as mentioned above, employees
working in what are reported as smaller sized units in Census Bureau statistics
may have employment conditions fixed by a parent holding company or by terms
of a licensing or franchising agreement.
52. P. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: PROCEDURAL PROBLEMS IN THE LAW OF PARENT AND SUB-
SIDIARY CORPORATIONS 469-70 (1983). Fluor Corporation had a total of 232 subsidiaries and Sears Roebuck had a
total of 103 subsidiaries. Id.
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IV. MANAGEMENT AND CONTROL OF LARGE CORPORATIONS
In 1985 the 500 largest industrial corporations employed 17.3 % of all persons
privately employed (excluding those employed by railroads)." The top 200 of
those corporations employed 80% of the employees of those corporations, made
84.6% of the sales and had 85.1% of the assets of the group.18 The persons man-
aging and directing the affairs of these corporations do not fit the stereotype of
entrepreneurial capitalists.
As long ago as 1932 Adolph Berle and Gardiner Means demonstrated that the
development of the large corporation in America had produced a separation of
ownership and control. 9 All authorities on corporation law agree that a concept of
shareholder democracy has no place in understanding actions of large corpora-
tions. Shareholders do not control the activities of large corporations; sharehold-
ers have practically no effect upon those activities.6" Indeed, it has been
persuasively argued that the debt obligations of leveraged buyout organizations is
a more effective monitor of managerial activities than shareholder control." The
course of development of corporation law by both state legislatures and state judi-
ciaries has been to elevate the status of the corporation as an entity62 while con-
stantly reducing and restricting the power of shareholders. Individual
shareholders have become investors with an exposure to liability limited to their
investment in the stock-an investment that individual shareholders frequently
can retrieve with a telephone call to their brokers. A large proportion of the stock
of major corporations is now held by retirement trust funds whose beneficiaries
have an interest diffused among all the other holdings of the funds.
An unsophisticated reading of state laws governing incorporation would leave
the impression that the selection of the directors of a corporation is the prerogative
and responsibility of shareholders. In fact the shareholders do not determine who
will be the directors of a large corporation; that is done by the incumbent manage-
57. Id. at 499, table 832; id. at 513, table 839.
58. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988513, table 859 (108th ed. 1987).
59. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (1932).
60. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY xix (2d ed. 1968); K. Brew-
ster, The Corporation And Economic Federalism, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 72 (E. Mason ed.
1959); A. Chayes, The Modem Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25,
39 (E. Mason ed. 1959); M.A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 97 (1976); E. Latham, The
Body Politic of the Corporation, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 218, 224 (E. Mason ed. 1959); E.
Rostow, To Whom And For What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN
SOCIETY 46, 53-54 (E. Mason ed. 1959).
61. Jensen, Eclipse of the Public Corporation, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 67-70 [hereinafter JEN-
SEN].
62. M. HORWITZ, Santa Clara Revisted: The Development of Corporate Theory, in SAMUEL & MILLER, CORPO-
RATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 13, 25, 35-37, 53-54 (Samuel & Miller eds. 1987); R. NA-
DER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 33-61 (1976) [hereinafter NADER].
63. According to a June, 1989, report of the Employee Benefit Research Institute, pension assets amounted to
$2.3 trillion, and constituted 25% of the total equity in the U.S. economy and 15% of taxable bonds. 16 Pens.
Rep. (BNA) 1055 (June 19, 1989). Much earlier it was estimated that pension funds owned at least 25% of the
equity capital of American business, and that by 1985 pension fund holdings would be at least 50% of the equity
capital of American business. P. DRUCKER, THE UNSEEN REVOLUTION 1 (1976).
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ment through its power to control nominations to the board and the solicitation of
proxies.6 Many shareholders do not vote; most return the proxies without ques-
tion. Even the large pension trust funds and insurance company investors usually
vote for directors selected by incumbent management without questioning the wis-
dom of that management's decision to nominate persons who will continue the
management in office." These institutional investors do not attempt to control
corporate management. If dissatisfied with management, the institutional investor
will find it easier to sell the stock rather than take on the burdens of battling an
incumbent management."
Nor do the directors control the affairs of the large corporations. "Outside" di-
rectors are usually drawn from the business world and are engaged in their own
pursuits. They do not have the time to acquire a comprehensive understanding of
the affairs of the corporation, and their dependency upon the chief executive offi-
cer for renomination to the board effectively curbs any inclination to look beneath
or beyond the reports made by management to the board.67 Some outside direc-
tors, such as attorneys, may be economically dependent upon management ap-
proval and therefore have no greater independence than would an employee of the
corporation.
An extreme example of how uninformed directors can be found in the accounts
of the collapse of the Penn Central Corporation. Penn Central directors approved
new employment contracts for eight corporate executives just six hours before its
petition in bankruptcy was filed, apparently without questioning whether their
64. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 125-26, n. 14 (rev. ed. 1968)
[hereinafter BERLE AND MEANS]; M.A. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 97, 141-48 (1976);
GALBRAITH, supra note 32, at 50; Introduction, CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 6 (Sa-
muels & Miller, eds. 1987); C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 82-83 (1975); THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SO-
CIETY (E. Mason ed. 1959); Blumberg, Reflections on Proposals for Corporate Reform Through Change in the
Composition of the Board of Directors: "Special Interest"or "Public"Directors, 53 B.U.L. REV. 547, 548 (1973).
Ross Perot, commenting on the board of directors of General Motors, said, "Although [the board] includes sev-
eral outstanding people, this group collectively owns virtually no GM stock (approximately 19,000 shares out of
30 million) and was effectively chosen by the management of GM." Perot, How I Would Turn Around GM, FOR-
TUNE, Feb. 15, 1988, at 45-46.
65. E. Rostow, To Whom and for What Ends Is Corporate Management Responsible?, in THE CORPORATION IN
MODERN SOCIETY, 46, 53 (E. Mason ed. 1959). But see Shareholders Unfurl Their Banner "Don't Tread On Us",
Bus. WK., June 11, 1990, at 66-67 (summarizing some recent efforts by trust funds to assert control over corpo-
rate managers); see also Bartlett, Big Funds Pressing for Voice in Managment of Companies, N.Y. Times, Feb. 23,
1990, at A l, col. 1 (national ed.); Light, The Privitization of Equity, HARV. Bus. REV., Sept.-Oct. 1989, at 62-63.
66. JENSEN, supra note 61, at 66.
67. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 207; W.O. DOUGLAS, DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 46-47 (1969); M.A.
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 141-48 (1976); KAYSEN, THE CORPORATION: How MUCH
POWER? WHAT SCOPE? THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 91 (E. Mason ed. 1959); NADER supra note 62, at
96, 101-02, 125-28; BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 207; L. SOLOMON, D. SCHWARTZ & J. BAUMAN, CORPO-
RATIONS: LAW AND POLICY 1353-58 (2d. 1988) [hereinafter SOLOMON]; Introduction, THE CORPORATION IN MOD-
ERN SOCIETY 5, 13 (E. Mason ed. 1959); Blumberg, Reflections on Corporate Reform Through Change in the
Composition of the Board of Directors: "Special Interest"or "Public"Directors, 53 B.U.L. REV. 547, 548 (1973);
Conard, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L. REV. 941, 950 (1977); Solomon, Restructuring the
Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise, 76 MICH. L. REv. 581 (1978).
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conduct had created a financial crisis in the company. 8 The extremity of the ex-
ample is in the consequences, not in the lack of information or involvement in the
affairs of the corporation.
In the first edition of their book, The Modern Corporation and Private Property,
Berle and Means reported that as of 1929 twelve of the 200 largest corporations
were in private ownership, ten had a majority ownership, forty-six and one-half
were under minority control, forty-one were controlled through a legal device
such as a holding company, and eighty-eight and one-half were under management
control. In the revised edition of their book they reported that as of 1963 none of
the two hundred largest corporations was privately owned, five had a majority
ownership, eighteen were under minority control, and eight were controlled by a
legal device. One hundred sixty-nine, or over 80 %, were under management con-
trol. Those one hundred sixty-nine corporations under management control held
85 % of the assets of the group.69 There is no reason to believe the trend disclosed
by Berle and Means' statistics has ended, and control by management of the 200
largest non-financial corporations now must exist for an even higher proportion of
the group if it is not the sole mode of control.
Professor Eisenberg challenged the use of the largest of corporations as repre-
sentative of shareholder participation in the direction of corporate actions. His
study of corporations, the stock of which is listed on the New York Stock Exchange
or the American Stock Exchange, led him to believe that in half or more of those
corporations with less than 1000 shareholders, the ten shareholders with the larg-
est holdings held 50 % or more of the stock. This would be an impressive concen-
tration, but it certainly does not establish all ten as individual owner-managers.
His statistics also indicate that of the 43,000 corporations considered to be pub-
licly owned, only 8,000 had less than 100 shareholders; about 26,000 had 100 to
499 shareholders; about 5000 had 500 to 1,500 shareholders; about 1,700 had
1,500 to 3,000 shareholders; and 1,800 had more than 3,000 shareholders.7"
68. NADER, supra note 62, at 96. See also C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 125-28 (1975). A Security and
Exchange Commission study states:
Pennsylvania Railroad and New York Central directors were accustomed to a generally inactive role in
company affairs. They never changed their view of their role. Both before and after the merger [on Febru-
ary 1, 1968] they relied on oral descriptions of company affairs. They failed to perceive the complexities
of the merger or the fact that appropriate groundwork and planning had not been done. After the merger
they claim to have been unaware of the magnitude of the fundamental operational problems or the critical
financial siuation until near the end. [The Penn Central Co. went into bankruptcy on June 21, 1970.]
They did not receive or request written budgets or cash flow information which were essential to under-
standing the condition of the company or the performance of management. Only late in 1969 did they
begin requesting such information and even then it was not made available in a form that was meaningful
or useful.
SEC Staff Study of the Financial Collapse of the Penn Central Co. - Summary [1972-73 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rept. (CCH) § 78,931 at 82 (August 31, 1972).
69. BERLE & MEANS, supra note 64, at 358.
70. Eisenberg, A Larger Role for Shareholders, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERN-
ANCE-THE ALI-ABA Symposiums 1977-1978 133, 135 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979). For more detail of the study,
see M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 40-41 (1976).
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Eisenberg also demonstrated that there is a significant degree of concentration
of shareholdings in the very largest corporations. Thirty percent of the 1967 For-
tune 500 corporations had concentration of stock holdings of ten percent or more
in an individual or members of a single family.71 Notwithstanding this demonstra-
tion of concentration of shareholdings in publicly held corporations, Eisenberg
concluded that in many if not most such corporations de facto control resides with
management rather than with shareholders.72 His contribution thus supplements
the work of Berle and Means, but does invalidate their conclusion that manage-
ment has been separated from ownership of large corporations.
A recent development in business organization, leveraged buyout organiza-
tions, provides a reverse eddy in the separation of ownership and control, accom-
plished largely by substituting debt for equity ownership. But as of 1988 leveraged
buyout organizations represented only 2.5% of outstanding public company eq-
uity, and "[m]ost LBO transactions are completed with a goal of returning the re-
configured company to the public market within three to five years."73
This power of control of the very large corporations is vested in at most a few
thousand persons, almost all of whom must be white males. 74 Recognition that so
much power is exercised by such a small group raises what has been called a ques-
tion of legitimacy.75 The question is: By what right do these persons govern such
an important part not only of our economic lives, but through the economic impact
of corporate activities limit our alternatives and choices for other aspects of life,
the environment, and the nation's relationships with the rest of the world? They
have not been chosen by stockholders and they no longer function as agents of the
stockholders. They have not been elected by employees, consumers, or the gen-
eral public, and thus lack a legitimization enjoyed by political leaders to affect a
constituency. Nor can they today proclaim that a divine right of royalty or nobility
entitles their exercise of such vast power. Yet they exercise a power fairly compara-
ble to that of the feudal nobility, perpetuating themselves in power until retirement
and then selecting their successors." And they exercise this power without any
71. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 45-51 (1976) [hereinafter EISENBERG].
72. EISENBERG, supra note 71, at 97.
73. JENSEN, supra note 61, at 63, 72.
74. Mason, Introduction, THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY (E. Mason ed. 1959).
75. INTRODUCTION: CORPORATE AMERICA, IN SAMUELS & MILLER, CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY 6 (1987); J.W.
HURST, THE LEGITIMACY OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION 58-111 (1970).
76. J.K. Galbraith's appraisal is that, "Executive life, so far from being competitive and dangerous, is highly
secure." GALBRAITH, supra note 32, at 94. He based this appraisal in part on two studies, one of which showed
that of 800 senior executives receiving the highest salaries in each of approximately three hundred industrial,
railroad, and utility corporations three quarters had been with their particular company for more than twenty
years. The other showed that of 308 senior executives who were in office in 1925, 265 remained with the same
firm until death or retirement. Id. Another study showed that 52% of all major executives of contemporary cor-
porations are the sons of men who have been executives, major or minor, or owners of small or large enterprises.
Warner, The Corporation Man, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 106, 107 (E. Mason ed. 1959). The
author concluded that the status of business leader in great corporations was more open to free competition for
persons from lower social and economic levels than it had been twenty years earlier. Id. at 108.
Despite substantial dissatisfaction with his leadership, Roger Smith, chief executive officer of General Motors,
is reported to have said that he had "every intention of naming his own successor, as most GM chief executives
before him have." Moore, Make-or-Break Time For General Motors, FORTUNE, Feb. 15, 1988, at 39.
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real controls or restraints imposed by the law of the state under which they were
incorporated."
It is argued, however, that the actions of management are controlled by forces
of the market and the laws of economics .78 The argument proceeds on the assump-
tion that if a management fails to maximize profits the consequence will be a drop
in the value of the stock of the corporation, which will in turn lead to shareholder
dissatisfaction and difficulties in obtaining funds from the capital market. Lack of
funds will worsen the profitability of operations and ultimately lead to a proxy
fight to replace the incumbent directors and the incompetent managers who chose
them. The weakness of the argument is that such proxy fights seldom develop; 79 it
is much easier for the dissatisfied shareholder to dispose of the stock by selling it.80
Moreover, while corporations do seek funds from the market, a substantial pro-
portion of all capital entering industry, perhaps as much as 60 %, is internally gen-
erated. 81
Nevertheless we are assured by some defenders of the efficiency of the market
that activities of large corporations are subject to economic controls because of the
possibility of takeovers by corporate raiders. The theory is that if an incompetent
incumbent management has allowed the income of a corporation to fall to less than
should be realized with the assets of the corporation, the market value of the stock
will drop, and a corporate raider will appear, pay shareholders what is closer to the
true value of the stock, and ultimately install a competent management.82 Exten-
sive publicity given corporate takeover attempts creates an impression that this
view has validity.
There are studies indicating that there are substantial and statistically signifi-
cant increases in the price of the stock of the targets in successful takeovers, but
the financial motivations for such takeovers include the use of underutilized tax
77. Shareholder suits to correct or obtain compensation for improvident management decisions have been
subjected to severe limitations by statutes. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS 1035-44 (3d
ed. 1983). Such derivative suits now have become of very dubious value. Manne, The 'Higher Criticism"of the
Modem Corporation, 62 COLUM. L. REv. 399, 409-10 (1962). Apparently there is no empirical evidence that
derivative litigation benefits shareholders beyond the costs of the litigation nor does the market reflect any posi-
tive benefit from shareholder derivative suits. N. Wolfson, The Theoretical and Empirical Failings of the American
Law Institute's Principles of Corporate Governance, in THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE AND CORPORATE GOVERN-
ANCE 69, 108 (Mink ed. 1987) [hereinafter WOLFSON].
78. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 303-05 (2d ed. 1977); N. WOLFSON, supra note 77, at 80; Katz,
Responsibility and the Modern Corporation, 3 J. L. & EcoN. 75, 84-85 (1960); Manne, Mergers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 73 J. PoL. ECON. 110, 114-19 (1965); Manne, The "Higher Criticism'of the Modern Cor-
poration, 62 COLuM. L. REv. 399, 407-11,430-32 (1962).
79. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J. 1197, 1224 n.78 (1984).
80. Berle, Modern Function of the Corporate System, 62 COL. L. REv. 433, 438 (1962)[hereinafter Berle]. In
addition, proxy fights are generally very expensive and suffer the disadvantage that the benefit of replacement of
the incompetent managers will go in large part to other shareholders rather than to those who undertook to chal-
lenge the incumbents. Manne, supra note 62, 73 J. POL. ECON. at 114-15.
81. Berle, supra note 80, 62 COLUM. L. REv. at 440. An explanation for the recent development of leveraged
buyouts is that managements prefer to retain cash earnings, even though it may be inefficient to do so, rather than
face the risks of facing the market for capital if an investment need should develop. JENSEN, supra note 61, at 66.
82. Manne, supra note 77; WOLFSON, supra note 77; 11 N. KY L. REv. at 515-16; 73 J. POL. ECON. at 115-17.
See also P. SAMuELSON, EcoNoMics 480-81 (11 th ed. 1980).
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losses, avoidance of bankruptcy charges, increased power in product markets, and
other advantages than that of replacing an inefficient target management. 3 The
conclusion that cumbersome takeover mechanisms provide what may be consid-
ered market control is at best somewhat amazing, particularly when consideration
is given to the proportional infrequency of takeover attempts, and the even lower
frequency of successful takeovers4 Nevertheless it has been described by one of
the staunchest supporters of the view that large corporations are subject to eco-
nomic controls as "the best evidence (not perfect, but the best) that a change in the
control of the assets of the target firm would improve economic efficiency.""5 Pro-
fessor Alfred Conard of the University of Michigan, who enjoys deserved respect
as an authority on corporations and business organizations, does not share that
conviction. He explained: "A few years ago, financial economists propounded the
theory that managerial fidelity was enforced by the 'market for control.' But a se-
ries of successful defenses against takeover bids, with judicial approval, have de-
stroyed any illusion about the efficiency of that market. 88
Incumbent managements were not sufficiently assured that takeover mecha-
nisms were ineffective. As Conard indicates, managers have been successful in
changing corporation law to protect themselves from the possibility of market con-
trols. Provisions of the corporation laws of many states allow amendments to the
by-laws of the corporation by the directors and amendments of the corporate char-
ter by a majority vote of the shareholders entitled to vote thereon. 7 The changes
which may be made by such amendments include changes in the rights, prefer-
ences, or privileges of shareholders. Incumbent management's power to obtain
proxies assures that stockholders will be recorded as approving of changes in the
charter desired by that management. "In recent years, dozens of companies have
amended their charters and by-laws to include supermajority voting requirements,
staggered board provisions, special nomination requirements for directors, provi-
sions authorizing issuance of 'blank check' preferred stock, stock transfer restric-
tions, and a myriad of other 'shark repellant' provisions . . . or 'poison pill'
83. M. Jensen & R. Ruback, The Market For Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 5,
7-10, 24-25 (1983).
84. Berle, supra note 80, 62 COLUM. L. REv. at 438.
85. Manne, In Defense ofthe Corporate Coup, 11 N. K. L. RE. 513,516 (1984).
86. Conard, The Voice of the Funds, 33 U. MICH. L. QUAD. 31, 32 n.2 (Winter 1989).
Professor Eisenberg earlier stated the view that the takeover mechanism "provides excessive leeway for mana-
gerial inefficiency, because of the high transaction costs of takeover bids resulting from their inherent mechanics,
the barriers to success thrown up by the Williams Act, and the ability of incumbent executives to oppose such bids
through use of the target corporation's own resources." M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION
166-67 (1976) (citations omitted).
87. SOLoMON, supra note 67, at 943. "Until the 1960's most states required approval of such changes by an
extraordinary majority-usually either two-thirds or even three quarters-of the stock. In 1969 Delaware
amended its statute to reduce the necessary vote to a majority of the outstanding shares entitled to vote." Id. The
same year "[tihe Model Business Corporation Act was changed to adopt the same rule." Id. Many but not all
states have since made the same change. Id. See also H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND
OTHER BUSINESS EXCEPTIONS 973-79 (3d ed. 1983).
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measures.""8 In February, 1988, a new Delaware statute added to the protection of
incumbent managements by providing a three-year ban on mergers involving a
stockholder who acquired 15 % of the voting stock of a corporation unless that ac-
quisition had been approved by the directors.8" Two years earlier the Delaware
Legislature served incumbent managements by enacting a statute which permitted
corporations to eliminate director liability for certain breaches of care, thereby
strengthening the position of managements in takeover contests ." In April of 1990
the Pennsylvania Legislature adopted a law which not only made hostile takeovers
more difficult but also limited the power of shareholders to change manage-
ments.91
The developments in Delaware are of great significance because more than half
of the Fortune 500 and 40% of the companies whose stock is listed on the New
York Stock Exchange are incorporated under the laws of that state.92 Other states,
fearful of losing the revenue obtained as the state of incorporation, have tradition-
ally matched Delaware in providing protection to incumbent managements. 93 State
regulation of the defensive measures used by incumbent managements became so
lax that in 1988 the Securities and Exchange Commission acted to bar listing on
national exchanges of stock of any company that issues stock carrying more than
one vote per share.94 Nevertheless, incumbent managements continue to enjoy
great protection under state laws from market control. Berle and Means concluded
their study with an observation that has obvious significance for employment law:
On the one hand, the owners of passive property, by surrendering control and re-
88. Lautzenhiser, State and Federal Regulation of Shark Repellant Provisions: How Much Is Needed? 11 N. KY.
L. REv. 481 (1984).
89. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1990). "Other states, such as New York, Wisconsin, and Wash-
ington, . . . place a moratorium on mergers involving stockholders who purchase large chunks of stock ..
Marcotte, Will Anti- Takeover Laws Work?, A.B.A. J., May 1988, at 25.
90. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (1983). The statute permits the use of such provisions in new char-
ters, and will require approval of the shareholders for addition to existing charters. That approval will be obtained
easily in most cases through management's solicitation of proxies. The legislation was enacted as a response to
what were perceived as increased risks to directors created by decisions of the state Supreme Court, which in the
past had been very considerate of management interests. See Note, Fortifying the Directorial Stronghold: Dela-
ware Limits Director Liability, 29 B.C. L. REv. 481, 481-83 (1988).
91. N.Y. Times, Apr. 19, 1990, at Dl, col. 3.
92. P. Cooney, Delaware to Expand Chancery Court by Additional Judge, REUTER Bus. REPORT, Jan. 27, 1989,
available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, BUSRPT File (56% of the Fortune 500 companies and 45% of New York
Stock Exchange listed firms); Note, Fortifying the Directorial Stronghold: Delaware Limits Director Liability, 29
B.C.L. REv. 481, 500 (1988).
93. See H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES 31-32 (3d ed.
1983). See also Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663, 665-66,
668-69 (1974); Comment, The Poison Pill: A Panacea for the Hostile Corporate Takeover, 21 J. MARSHALL L. REv.
107, 119-28 (1987). As of 1983, thirty-eight states had enacted takeover or tender offer statutes. H. HENN & J.
ALEXANDER, supra, at 847-48.
The validity of such statutes has been challenged, sometimes with success, on the basis that they have unconsti-
tutionally burdened interstate commerce. See Pinto, Takeover Statutes: The Dormant Commerce Clause and State
Corporate Law, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 473 (1987).
94. Nash, Share Vote Proposal Approved, N.Y. Times, July 8, 1988, at Dl, col. 6.
In June, 1990, The Business Roundtable, an association of the chief executives of 200 large corporations, suc-
ceeded in having the S.E.C. order set aside. Hershey, U.S. Court Overturns S. E. C. Rule, N.Y. Times, June 13,
1990, at DI, col. 6 (nat. ed.).
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sponsibility over the active property, have surrendered the right that the corporation
should be operated in their sole interest, -they have released the community from
the obligation to protect them to the full extent implied in the doctrine of strict prop-
erty rights. At the same time, the controlling groups, by means of the extension of
corporate powers, have in their own interest broken the bars of tradition which re-
quire that the corporation be operated solely for the benefit of the owners of passive
property. Eliminating the sole interest of the passive owner, however, does not nec-
essarily lay a basis for the alternative claim that the new powers should be used in the
interest of the controlling groups. The latter have not presented, in acts or words any
acceptable defense of the proposition that these power should be so used. No tradi-
tion supports that proposition. The control groups have, rather, cleared the way for
the claims of a group far wider than either the owners or the control. They have
placed the community in a position to demand that the modern corporation serve not
alone the owners or the control but all society. 9
In his preface to the revised edition of their book Professor Berle observes that
large corporations are collective organizations engaged in operations like the op-
erations carried on by the state. He concludes that they are not justified in viewing
their plants, tools and organizations as their own, and that through their services
they have become an adjunct of the state, subject to regulations preventing reck-
less use of their market control." In his preface to the revised edition, Gardiner
Means notes that the statistics developed since publication of the first edition es-
tablishes that an even greater separation of ownership and control had occurred in
the ensuing thirty-five years. Accepting as the most articulate criticism of the free
corporate enterprise system that of Communists he makes a comparison of the
American and Russian systems governing economic power and decision-making,
commenting favorably upon the dispersion of initiative and decision making in the
American corporate system. He concludes, however, that basic questions must be
faced in determining how far it is necessary to go to canalize the action of corpo-
rate management to bring that action into conformity with the public interest. 7
Since the publication of the monumental work of Berle and Means many others
have further developed their proposition that large management controlled corpo-
rations should be operated in the interests of constituencies other than the share-
holders. There is general agreement among these authors that the employees of
95. A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY 311-12 (rev. ed. 1968).
96. Id. at xxvi.
97. Id. at xxxvii-xxxviii.
98. NADER, supra note 62; C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS (1975); A. Chayes, The Modern Corporation
and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25-45 (E. Mason ed. 1959); Solomon, Restruc-
turing the Corporate Board of Directors: Fond Hope-Faint Promise?, 76 MICH. L. REV. 581 (1978). See also P.
Blumberg, Reflections on Proposals for Corporate Reform Through Change in the Composition of the Board of Di-
rectors: "Special Interest"or "Public"Directors, 53 B.U.L. Rav. 547 (1973); Conard, Reflections On Public Inter-
est Directors, 75 MICH. L. REv. 941 (1971).
Professor Eisenberg takes a dim view of the ability of interest constituencies to contribute effectively to the con-
trol of a corporation, but agrees that the problems of a labor constituency would not be as great as those of other
constituencies. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 21-23 (1976).
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these large management controlled corporations should be considered such a con-
stituency. 99
V. EXAMPLES OF MANAGEMENT DECISIONS AFFECTING EMPLOYEES AND OTHERS
It is obvious that decisions made by managements which control large corpora-
tions have serious impacts on employees as well as other constituencies. A review
of a few such occasions may be of assistance in appraising whether the law govern-
ing collective bargaining constituencies could be improved by an understanding
that the employers of most employees are not individual capitalist entrepreneurs.
In 1981 the management of U.S. Steel, then the nation's largest steel producer,
decided to change that corporation into an oil or energy corporation. A review of
the notices of meetings of shareholders and proxy statements produces no indica-
tion that shareholders were involved in making that decision. The management
agreed to pay $6.3 billion to acquire Marathon Oil, using up accumulated cash of
$2.3 billion and borrowing additional billions at a time when interest rates stood
close to 15 %. 10 Subsequently, in 1985, that management announced that it would
acquire Texas Oil and Gas for an additional $3.6 billion through a merger which
gave Texas Oil stockholders more shares of stock than the then outstanding shares
of U.S. Steel."' A merger did require stockholder approval after the terms had
been arranged and, as might be expected, it was obtained.
The result of acquiring Marathon was a debt for the former U.S. Steel requiring
interest payments of $1 billion per year. The compulsion to reduce such a debt led
to the sale of choice assets of the corporation, including even its own home office
building. 02 Sale of assets supportive of steel production continued into 1988, with
the announcement of the sale of railroad and barge lines to help reduce the huge
debt accumulated in the corporation's transformation. 103 Even more recently, the
corporation, now renamed USX, proposed the dismantling of an entire steel-mak-
ing plant in Texas to permit its sale to Iraq.' °4 The 1989 Annual Report of USX
listed twelve more subsidiaries which had been sold to reduce the debt incurred
when the company entered the energy business.105
99. See supra note 98.
100. N.Y. Times, Nov. 20, 1981, at DI, col. 6.
101. Wall St. J., Feb. 12, 1986, at6, cols. 1-2.
102. Corporate Finance- U.S. Steel's Debt Shrouded Future Bus. WK., Oct. 18, 1982, at 154-55.
103. Wall St. J., June 21, 1988, at 4, cols. 1-2; N.Y. Times, June 21, 1988, at DI, cols. 4-5.
104. N.Y. Times, Aug. 19, 1988, at A1, cols. 1-3.
105. USX, 1989 ANNUAL REPoirr (1990).
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The consequences of these decisions, made by a management responsible to no
one, include the permanent loss of thousands of high paying jobs,106 the incapaci-
tation of what had been the country's largest steel producer to modernize its steel
producing facilties or expand operations. Announcement of the plan to acquire
Marathon Oil led the New York Times to ask in an editorial whether U.S. Steel had
a special duty to concentrate its energies and its financial resources to making
steel - a question that it seemed to answer in the affirmative by concluding with a
quoted observation that companies turning their back on a basic business can
wreck local economies, uproot employees, and leave the nation strapped.107 The
incapacitation of U.S. Steel has a particular significance now that a change in the
exchange rate of the dollar and foreign currencies has now made it possible to pro-
duce steel in the United States at prices lower than those prevailing in Japan or Ger-
many. 108
A recent ironic development was the establishment of a USX Shareholders Ad-
visory Committee by Carl C. Icahn, famous for his take-over activities. The
Committee unsuccessfully sought shareholder approval of a plan to divide USX
into two separate companies, one an oil or energy company and the other a steel
company, to be renamed U.S. Steel! Mr. Icahn argued that such a separation
106. In October, 1982, Business Week, stating a then common pessimistic view that U.S. Steel had mort-
gaged, if not jeopardized, its future, reported that one half of the company's unionized employees had been laid
off. See supra note 102. Later, reviewing Mr. Roderick's term as chief executive officer, Business Week reported
that he had eliminated the jobs of some 100,000 workers, which included 54 % of the white collar workers. Sy-
monds, Miles, Ivey, & Prokesch, The Toughest Job in Business - How They're Remaking U.S. Steel, Bus. WK.,
Feb. 25, 1985, at 50-56. Total U.S. Steel employment, which amounted to 166,800 in 1978, was reduced to
88,753 by 1984, and the number of employees represented by the United Steelworkers had been reduced from
108,000 to 31,000. Steel production capacity, which had been 38 million tons in 1978 was reduced to 26.2 mil-
lion tons in 1984. R. NADER & W. TAYLOR, THE BIG Boys: POWER & POSITION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 16-17
(1986).
It should be noted, however, that employment in basic steel generally fell sharply at the same time. During the
period from 1977 to 1985 the total number of workers employed in basic steel production in the nation declined
from 530,000 to 278,000. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1988 705 (108th
ed. 1987). By 1988, with a change in the exchange rate of the dollar, prospects for the steel industry as a whole
had improved significantly. Market Place: Basic Industries'Outlook Brighter, N.Y. Times, July 13, 1988, at D 10,
cols. 3-6.
107. N.Y. Times, December 2, 1981, at Dl, cols. 3-5.
An insight to the lack of concern for maintaining primacy in production and sale of steel may be gained by con-
sidering that the corporate officer most responsible for the change, David M. Roderick, rose from the ranks of
the corporation's financial department and not from production or sales. R. NADER & W. TAYLOR, THE BIG Boys:
POWER AND POSITION IN AMERICAN BUSINESS 11-14 (1986); Symonds, Miles, Ivey, & Prokesch, The Toughest Job
in Business - How 7hey're Remaking U.S. Steel, Bus. WK., Feb. 25, 1985, at 50-56. A bottom line criterion for
corporate actions may be acceptable to accountants, but it gives little consideration to employees who made in-
vestments for their futures by training for jobs producing steel.
108. With respect to production costs, see the letter from Peter F. Marcus, First Vice President, Paine Webber
Inc., Wall St. J., Apr. 22, 1988, at 33, cols. 1-2; Steelmakers'Inferiority Syndrome, N.Y. Times, August 7, 1989,
at DI, cols. 3-4.
The First Quarter Report of USX for 1988 referred to the dramatic return to profitability of the corporation's
steel production and tendered assurances that there will be a firming of oil prices that promised improvements in
the energy segment of its operations. Of the $1.3 billion budgeted for capital spending in 1988, $850 million was
targeted for energy purposes, and only $400 million for steel.
On September 9, 1988, David Roderick, chief executive officer of USX and engineer of the diversion of corpo-
ration assets from steel to production of oil and gas, predicted that the corporation's exports of steel would double
in the next year and that the increase in such sales was not to abate. Nevertheless he agreed that if the price were
right, USX might sell "20% or something like that" of its steel capacity to reduce its debt.
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would result in a very substantial increase in the value of the stock of USX.' In
January 1991, the arguments prevailed. Management, led by Charles A. Corry,
who replaced Mr. Roderick as chairman of the corporation, announced plans to
issue stock for its steel business, separating it from the energy portion of its opera-
tions.110
Another industry in which decisions made by managers responsible to no oth-
ers have had drastic effects upon employees, the communities in which those em-
ployees lived, and the nation at large, is the auto industry. The number of
employees engaged in the manufacture of motor vehicles and equipment fell from
876,000 in 1977 to 776,000 in 1986.11 This was in large part a consequence of the
fact that in the last twenty-five years foreign manufacturers of automobiles have
been increasing their share of the market for vehicles in the United States. Foreign
manufacturers achieved this success in large part because they offered Americans
small, easily maneuverable, and fuel efficient vehicles. American manufacturers
tenaciously held to the production of much larger cars because they believed they
could control customer choice and because they knew a higher margin of profit
could be realized on sales of larger and more expensive automobiles.
However, as early as the 1940's the United Autoworkers (UAW) urged manu-
facturers to build a small, fuel-efficient car, citing an opinion survey conducted by
the Society of Automotive Engineers that revealed that 60 % of the public favored
that type of automobile.112 It has been reported that when in the 1960's Walter
Reuther, then president of the United Autoworkers suggested to General Motors
chief labor negotiator that the company should produce a small car, he was
promptly informed that the company resented the union's intrusion into its strate-
gic planning.
113
By 1968, when imports had captured one-tenth of the sales, the American in-
dustry grudgingly recognized that the UAW might be right about the wisdom of
building small cars. General Motors, Ford, and American Motors reluctantly and
in a limited fashion moved in that direction. Chrysler Corporation, under the pres-
109. N.Y. Times, May 8, 1990, at Dl, col. 6; Icahn's USX Plan May Be Gaining Support, N.Y. Times, Mar.
19, 1990, at Dl, cols. 3-5. The solicitation sent to shareholders stated the belief that the separation would result
in an increase of more than 40% over the then present market value of the stock, and noted that the percentage
increase in the value of USX stock lagged behind the percentage increases in both oil and steel stock prices.
110. N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 1991, at D10 (late ed.); USX 1990 Annual Report, at 3.
The proxy statement accompanying the 1990 Annual Report states that the board unanimously approved the
steel stock proposal and believes that its adoption to be in the best interests of the corporation and all the stock-
holders. USX Annual Report, at 3. That same proxy statement indicates that David M. Roderick has continued
as a director of the corporation. Id. at 19. It would be amazing if the reported unanimity of the board indicates
that he believes that what so recently was accomplished under his leadership should be undone.
111. U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1989 724 (109th ed. 1988).
The reduction in employment was not due entirely to foreign competition. As Galbraith noted long ago, "[in
1960 the automobile industry had 172,000 fewer production workers than in 1953[, but it] produced about a half-
million more passenger cars and about the same number of trucks and buses." GALBRAITH, supra note 49, at 237.
112. Adams & Brock, Bigness and Social Efficiency: A Case Study of the U.S. Auto Industry, in CORPORATIONS
AND SOCIETY: POWER AND REsPONSIBILITY 219, 229 (Samuels & Miller ed. 1987) (citing Blumberg, Snarling
Cars, NEW REPUBLIC, Jan. 23, 1983, at 12).
113. WILLIAM SERRIN, THE COMPANY AND THE UNION 32 (1973).
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idency of Lynn Townsend was more resistant, with the consequence that Chrysler
was totally unprepared to respond to the oil embargo and energy crisis of 1973-
74. 11 That corporation lost $52 million in 1974 and a record $94.1 million in the
first quarter of 1975.115 On July 4, 1975, Mr. Townsend announced that he
planned to retire from his position of chairman and chief executive officer. 116 By
that time thousands of Chrysler employees had lost their jobs.
It is a matter of recent history that action of the government of the United States
saved the Chrysler Corporation, though the new president of the corporation, Lee
lacocco, is currently accorded most credit for that result. The United States guar-
anteed bank loans of $1.5 billion, conditioned upon the corporation raising an-
other $2 billion from dealers, suppliers, and reduced wages of its workers.117 The
chairman of the Loan Guarantee Board created by Congress to supervise the guar-
anteed loans announced that Chrysler's recovery plan had been found to be "realis-
tic and feasible," as required by Congress. He explained that an essential part of
the plan rested on increased production of small, fuel efficient automobiles. 118 Lee
Iaccoco's triumph was in large part accomplished by his acceptance of the Loan
Guarantee Board's requirement, a belated recognition of the validity of the recom-
mendations made twenty years earlier by Walter Reuther and the United Auto
Workers.
General Motors has not experienced the perils faced by Chrysler Corporation,
but it has seen its share of the domestic market for automobiles suffer a constant
and dramatic decrease. That decline in market share has been attributed, at least
by some, to the fact that the incumbent management, headed until recently by Mr.
Roger B. Smith, had not paid sufficient attention to customer desires and auto de-
sign, but instead has pursued policies which one might expect from an accountant
who rose from its financial department.119 Ross Perot, a Texas businessman whose
successes made him a billionaire, became a member of the board of directors of
General Motors after GM acquired Perot's Electronic Data Systems Corporation
(EDS) for $2.5 billion. 120 He soon criticized GM as unable to build cars customers
wanted, and denounced the stagnant corporate culture he found in the company.
Roger Smith succeeded in ridding himself of this forceful critic by having Gen-
eral Motors purchase Mr. Perot's GM stock for $750 million, in return for which
Mr. Perot resigned from the boards of GM and EDS.121 The price paid amounted
to about $33 per share, the average price of GM stock during the period the buy-
back was negotiated, and an additional special payment of $23.50 a share for con-
114. M. MORITZ & B SEAMAN, GOING FOR BROKE: THE CHRYSLER STORY 111-27 (1981). See also Mayer &
Jones, Chryslers Shake-out, NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1975, at 61-62; Ten Years Is Enough, TIME, July 21, 1975, at
46.
115. NEWSWEEK, July 14, 1975, at 61.
116. N.Y. Times, July 4, 1975, at A1, cols. 1-2.
117. FACTS ON FILE, Dec. 31, 1979, at 981 (available on Nexis).
118. FACTS ON FILE, May 23, 1980, at 383 (available on Nexis).
119. R. NADER & W. TAYLOR, THE BIG Boys: POWER & POSITION IN AMERICAN BuSINESS 65-68 (1986).
120. FACTS ON FILE, June 29, 1984, at 466 (available on Nexis).
121. Wall St. J.. Dec. 2. 1986. at 3. cols. 1-3.
[Vol. 11:309
THE MEANINGS OF EMPLOYER
tingent notes which had been issued at the time GM bought EDS. Those notes had
a value of only $9.20 at the time of that purchase.122 The deal was criticized by
some GM officials and United Auto Worker officials as an improvident use of
funds at a time when GM was scaling back in various programs and workers were
concerned about job security.123 Of course, there was no bargaining with the
United Auto Workers about the decision to so use the assets of the corporation.
Mr. Perot announced that he would put the money received into escrow to permit
reconsideration of the action, expressing the view that GM should have given its
various constituencies time to comment when GM was closing nine plants, putting
30,000 people out of work, cutting back on capital expenditures, and having diffi-
culties with market share and profitability. '24 An incumbent management, respon-
sible to no one, apparently has succeeded in its use of a substantial amount of
corporate assets for the purpose of preserving itself in a position of control, un-
checked and uncriticized.
The struggle between Frank Lorenzo and the unionized employees of Eastern
Airlines provides a more recent example of control of corporations by a person
with a relatively small personal investment. Mr. Lorenzo's control of Eastern Air-
lines existed because it was a wholly owned subsidiary of Texas Air, which was in
turn a subsidiary of Jet Capital. Jet Capital had invested only 2.8 % of the total cap-
ital of Texas Air, but by virtue of owning stock which had ten votes per share it had
34.1 % of the voting power in Texas Air. This was a very safe voting control over
the corporation. 2 Jet Capital was formed in 1969 when Mr. Lorenzo and a busi-
ness school friend together invested $35,000. Today Mr. Lorenzo owns stock
which gives him 45.9 % of the voting power in Jet Capital, enough so that concur-
rence of only one of the other larger shareholders assures control. 26 By compli-
cated financial maneuvering, but largely using debt instruments, frequently junk
bonds, Jet Capital gained control of Texas Air, and through it control of Continen-
tal Airlines. '27 In March, 1989, Mr. Lorenzo sold all of the stock which he person-
ally owned in Texas Air."12
It must be recognized that the purchasers of the debt instruments and the stock-
holders of Texas Air apparently made and may have held their investments be-
cause of their confidence in Mr. Lorenzo's abilities in finance and the running of
airlines. There has been no indication of any attempt by those investors to control
or supervise his activities. But he most certainly is not an entrepreneur capitalist
who provided the plant and equipment and thus the opportunity for employment of
the employees of Eastern Airlines, many of whom dedicated many years of their
122. Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1986, at 12, col. 3.
123. Wall St. J., Dec. 3, 1986, at 12, col. 2.
124. Wall St. J., Dec. 2, 1986, at 6, cols. 1-3.
125. N.Y. Times, Mar. 20, 1989, at B5, cols. 1-3.
126. Id. In April, 1986, the business school friend sold 137,600 shares of Jet Capital to Mr. Lorenzo and Carl
Pohlad. N.Y. Times, Apr. 14, 1986, at D14, col. 2.
127. N.Y. Times, supra, note 117; Top Gun, TExAs MONTHLY, Mar. 1987, at 98-103, 185-90.
128. NEWSDAY, Mar. 19, 1989.
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lives and shaped their employment abilities by working for the corporation. On
the basis of investment in the company it does not seem unfair that Mr. Lorenzo
should have had to bargain with the representative of those employees about man-
agement decisions which affected and in many cases destroyed their future em-
ployment. Though undoubtedly talented, he did not bring to the company abilities
and insights requiring unlimited freedom for action; to the contrary, the bank-
ruptcy judge who placed Eastern Airlines under the control of a trustee believed
that Mr. Lorenzo had not been a great asset for the enterprise. 129
Another recent development revealing the power which incumbent managment
thought it could exercise is found in the sale of RJ Reynolds Nabisco to the consor-
tium of Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. 130 The unusual development in the sale
was a show of independence by the corporation's outside directors. Mr. F. Ross
Johnson, chief executive officer of RJR-Nabisco announced to those directors in
October, 1988, a plan by which he and other top managment persons would make
a leveraged buy-out of the corporation, paying $75 per share for its stock.1 31 Al-
though he had not previously consulted the board, Mr. Johnson apparently be-
lieved that he would receive approval from the outside directors because he had
treated them handsomely, doubling their pay to $50,000 per year, awarding to
them six figure consulting contracts, making charitable donations in their names
to favorite charities, etc.132
The outside directors were, however, so shocked by the favored treatment Mr.
Johnson proposed for himself and other management people that they decided they
should put the company up for auction, and did so.' 3 3 The price finally received
from Kohlberg, Kravis, Roberts & Co. was $109 per share, far above the price
first suggested by the incumbent management, but below the final bid of $112 per
share made by that management group; the outside directors rejected the higher
bid because of their conclusion that out of personal greed the managment group
would break up the corporation in an unacceptable manner.
134
It is of course fortunate that the employees of RJR-Nabisco were thus protected
from the dismemberment of their employer by the unexpected independence of the
outside directors. But it seems intolerable that they should be excluded from nego-
tiations which could so affect their employment with a company for which they
had worked for many years.
Other examples of an incumbent corporate management, likewise responsible
to no one, pursuing policies which led to the loss of thousands of jobs as well as
129. Headlines, N.Y. Times, Apr. 22, 1990, §4, at 11, col. 4. See also Eastern' Fate Now With Trustee, N.Y.
Times, Apr. 20, 1990, at DI, cols. 3-5.
130. A detailed history of the development is presented in B. BURROUGH & J. HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT THE
GATE (1990).
131. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1988, § 3, at 14, col. 3.
132. Quickel, HardLessons of the Eighties, BUSINESS MONTHLY, June 1989, at 65.
133. Saporito, How Ross Johnson Blew the Buyout, FORTUNE, Apr. 24, 1989, at 296.
134. Features, BUSINESS MONTHLY, June 1989, at 62.
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other societal injuries have been documented elsewhere.1 3 The losses thus suf-
fered constituted additions to, or at least lost opportunities to avoid, the recent and
substantial loss of jobs in basic industries to foreign competition.
VI. THE ROLE OF SMALL EMPLOYERS
As stated above, in 1985 more than one-fourth of privately employed persons
(excluding railroad employees and self-employed persons) worked in units of less
than twenty employees.1 3 Because many of those units may be subsidiaries of
larger holding companies, not all of that quarter of employees work for small em-
ployers. However, small employers play a more important role in employment than
that suggested by their proportion of total employment. At least in recent years
new and small employers have provided most of the jobs to replace lost jobs and
most of the growth in employment. Thus, one study indicated that about two-
thirds of all net new jobs between 1969 and 1970 were created by firms with
twenty or fewer employees and about 80 % of all replacement jobs between 1969
and 1976 were created by establishments in business four years or less.137 Between
1972 and 1976, firms with less than fifty employees generated basically all net
new jobs in the Northeast, almost 80% in the North Central, and about two-thirds
of the new jobs in the South and West.' 38 The job loss rate averaged about 8 % an-
nually, and resulted in almost a 50% job loss every five years throughout various
areas of the country, with job growth rates depending upon the rate at which lost
jobs were replaced. 139 The viability of these small employers appears to be fragile,
with a death rate only slightly below the birth rate.14 The contribution made by
small employers to new employment thus appears to be related to the frequency
with which small businesses fail and are replaced by other small businesses. The
statistics generated in the referenced study were confirmed by statistics generated
in two recent studies conducted elsewhere.
14'
It thus appears that, at least until the growth of employment in manufacturing at
the end of the 1980's, most job creation and growth has been produced by employ-
ers small enough to be individual entrepreneurs who are probably not capitalists of
enormous wealth.
135. NADER, supra note 62, at 77-80; Kaysen, The Corporation: How Much Power? What Scope?, in THE COR-
PORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 85, 92-93 (E. Mason ed. 1959); Adams & Brock, Bigness and Social Efficiency: A
Case Study of the U.S. Auto Industry, in CORPORATIONS AND SOCIETY: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITY 219-37 (Sa-
muels & Miller ed. 1987).
136. See supra note 50, 53, 54 and accompanying text.
137. Greene, Tracking Job Growth in Private Industry, 105 MONTHLY LAB. REV. 4 (Sept. 1982). Greene's re-




140. For example, in 1974-76, 6.7 % of the job increases resulted from the establishment of new businesses
and 5.7% of thejob losses resulted from termination of established businesses. Migration of businesses played a
relatively unimportant role, accounting for. 11% of employment changes. Greene, supra note 152, at 5.
141. The studies are summarized in Greene, supra note 137. One was a study by the Brookings Institute and
the other was a study of the University of California Institute of Urban and Regional Development.
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It is unlikely that organizing of employees of a newly established small business
is the most efficient use of the limited resources of unions. 1 2 If they do organize a
new small business, it is unlikely they will want to bargain about the direction
which that new business should take. Small employers, in which management and
ownership must frequently be joined, have a stronger claim than managements of
large corporations to freedom from bargaining with a union about plans for future
development. Moreover, because the companies fail so frequently employees are
less likely to have made a lifetime commitment to development of skills for the
business. Thus, for small employers it makes more sense to speak of a "right" to go
out of business.
VII. REQUIRING BIG BUSINESS TO INCORPORATE UNDER A FEDERAL LAW
For those (other than specialists in state corporation law) who consider the mat-
ter, it is amazing that the law governing the incorporation of the businesses con-
trolling the American economy is state rather than federal law. As mentioned
above, manufacturing corporations with assets of $1 billion and over received
69% of the profits from manufacturing in 1984 and made over 90% of the sales of
manufactured goods." The law governing what those corporations may do and
the manner in which they must undertake to accomplish their objectives most cer-
tainly is not a matter of local concern. Quite to the contrary, the local concern of
the Delaware legislature for financing state government from corporation filing
fees has led it to permit revision of its corporation laws for the benefit of incum-
bent managements without concern for the effect of the protection provided on the
American economy. Other states compete, but the competition is in providing
those managements a protective corporation law, and not on the basis of what the
American economy needs or what is best for that economy.
This lack of concern is anomolous, to say the least, when consideration is given
to the federal laws regulating the internal activities of labor unions. The Labor
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959'" establishes a bill of rights
for members of labor unions which guarantees members the right to participate in
deliberations and vote upon the business of membership meetings, to express
views and arguments, and in the case of union locals to vote upon a proposed in-
crease in dues. 45 Labor organizations are prohibited from limiting the right of any
member from instituting an action in any court or in a proceeding before an ad-
ministrative agency, subject to a possible requirement of exhausting internal hear-
ing procedures for a period not in excess of four months, all regardless of what
142. Nevertheless, a high proportion of NLRB elections involve relatively small employers. Unions Enjoying
Increased Success in Elections, 134 Lab. Rel. Rep. (BNA) 17, 18 (May 7, 1990). In 1989 the NLRB held 2,526
representation elections in units of less than 50 employees, 546 elections in units of between 50 and 99 employ-
ees, 497 elections in units of 100 to 499 employees, and 56 elections in units of more than 500 employees.
143. See supra notes 44 and 45.
144.29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1988).
145.29 U.S.C. §411 (1988).
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might be the state law governing unincorporated associations.146 Members af-
fected by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement are entitled to receive
copies of the agreement.' 47 Labor organizations are required to file with the Sec-
retary of Labor copies of their constitutions and by-laws as well as detailed state-
ments concerning the procedures followed with respect to a wide variety of
activities, including authorization for bargaining demands, ratification of contract
terms, and authorization of strikes. Labor organizations are also required to file
annual financial reports, setting out not only information concerning the financial
condition of the organization but also the salaries, allowances, and other direct or
indirect disbursements (including reimbursed expenses) to each officer and to
every employee receiving more than $10,000 per year. " Officers and employees
are likewise required to file detailed reports.' 49
Title III of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act limits the
power of international unions to use trusteeships for the purpose of controlling lo-
cal unions and provides the basis for actions by either the Secretary of Labor or
members of a local to set aside a trusteeship improperly imposed by international
officers to maintain their control.' 50 It also regulates terms of office and election
procedures for labor unions.' The Secretary of Labor is directed to investigate
complaints of violations of the statute's detailed provisions concerning elections
and, if he finds probable cause to believe a violation occurred, to bring suit to set
aside the election.' 2 The Act further establishes fiduciary responsibilities of offi-
cers of labor unions and prohibits certain persons from holding office. '
53
Comparisons of unlike institutions are difficult if not dangerous, but it appears
that the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act provides greater protec-
tion for the interests of union members from the activities of the officers of their
organizations than state corporation laws provide for the interests of shareholders
146.29 U.S.C. §41 l(a)(4) (1988).
147. 29 U.S.C. § 414 (1988).
148.29 U.S.C. §431 (1988).
149. 29 U.S.C. § 432(a) (1988). Employers and labor relations consultants also are required to file reports. 29
U.S.C. §433 (1988).
150. 29 U.S.C. §§ 461-464 (1988). See United Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Brown, 343 F.2d 872 (10th Cir.
1965) (trusteeship imposed to compel local to affiliate with a district council and to raise its dues); Schonfeld v.
Raftery, 271 F Supp. 128 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 381 F.2d 446 (2d Cir. 1967) (trusteeship imposed to keep an en-
trenched group in power).
151.29 U.S.C. §§ 481-483 (1988). Officers of national and international unions must be elected not less often
than every five years, and officers of local unions must be elected not less often than every three years.
152. 29 U.S.C. § 482(b) (1988). A reviewing court will not substitute its judgment for that of the Secretary as
to whether such a suit should be undertaken, but it can compel the Secretary to provide a statement of the reasons
fbr refusing to do so to permit the court to determine whether the Secretary exercised his discretion in an arbi-
trary or capricious manner. Dunlop v. Bachowski, 421 U.S. 560 (1975).
153.29 U.S.C. §§ 501-504 (1988).
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against the activities of management in corporate affairs. 5 4 More to the point for
present purposes, the statement of policy of the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act recites that "in order to accomplish the objective of a free flow of
commerce it is essential that labor organizations, employers, and their officals ad-
here to the highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct in administering
the affairs of their organizations, particularly as they affect labor-management re-
lations .1" 5 If the impact of labor-management relations on commerce is sufficient
to justify the detailed federal regulation of internal union affairs, most certainly
the impact of corporate management decisions on the free flow of commerce - for
example, a decision that the nation's largest steel producer should incapacitate it-
self to become an energy based corporation - calls for regulation of the procedures
and controls on the decision-making process under federal law, not state law.
Proposals for a requirement of incorporation under federal laws have been
around for a long time, and there can be little doubt that such a requirement would
be constitutional.15 1 Indeed, as long ago as 1862 the Union Pacific Railroad was
incorporated under federal law to construct the first railroad running from the East
to the Pacific Ocean. 5 7 More recently, Comsat, the corporation established to op-
erate communication satellites, was organized under federal law. 
158
There is a general consensus that the presence of government directors on the
board of Union Pacific did not bring about the expected vindication of the public
154. The shareholder derivative action is probably the greatest protection provided stockholders against
actions of management believed to be against the interests of the corporation and its shareholders. A leading text
begins its discussion of such suits as follows:
Early restrictions on shareholder derivative actions developed in the federal courts, primarily in Hawes
v. Oakland, are now part of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 23.1 states the 'contemporaneous-
share-ownership' requirement, bars collusive actions, and requires prior exhaustion of intracorporate
remedies. Rule 23.1 also prohibits the dismissal or compromise of such actions without court approval.
Some state statutes have imposed the 'contemporaneous-share-ownership' requirement; required the
small plaintiff-shareholder to post security for the corporation's litigation expenses, including attorneys'
fees; provided for indemnifying corporate personnel for their litigation expenses; imposed a special stat-
ute of limitations for certain actions against directors or officers far mismanagement; or provided for re-
imbursement of the defendants' expenses by the plaintiffs even when security therefor has not previously
been given. Several states which have patterned their rules of procedure on the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure have promulgated most of Rule 23. 1.
H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAws OF CORPORATIONS 1041 (1983).
155.29 U.S.C. § 401(a) (1988).
156. This conclusion was reached as long ago as 1913, in a carefully documented study. R. HEISLER, FEDERAL
INCORPORATION: CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS INVOLVED (1913) (republished 1982). Heisler reached that conclu-
sion under standards prevailing before the monumental change of view of the power of Congress under the com-
merce clause announced in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). Later decisions of the
Supreme Court firmly establish the power of Congress under the commerce clause to regulate almost any eco-
nomic activity. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317
U.S. 111 (1942).
157. 12 Stat. 489 (1862), as amended 13 Stat. 361 (1864).
158. See Schwartz, Governmentally Appointed Directors In A Private Corporation - The Communications Satel-
lite Act of1962, 79 HAiv. L. REV. 350 (1965).
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interest.159 The experience demonstrates appointment of government directors to
the boards of large corporations will not by itself ensure that adequate consider-
ation will be given in corporate undertakings to the public interest or the interests
of the constituencies the directors are to represent.
An obvious concern about a federal law requiring government or public interest
directors is that political considerations would govern their selection and the poli-
cies they pursue. The experience following World War II when the U.S. Govern-
ment took over a German corporation, General Aniline, as enemy property
demonstrates that if government or public interest directors are to be required un-
der a federal incorporation law the statute must have protections against political
maneuvering. '60
Professor Christopher Stone, undaunted by these obstacles, proposed in 1975
that large corporations engaged in manufacturing, retailing, or transportation be
required to have general public directors.'61 His proposal includes provisions to
ensure that the public directors will be informed and effective in ensuring that
there is compliance with laws and that proper consideration is given to environ-
mental impacts of corporate activities.1 2
Ralph Nader, Mark Green, and Joel Seligman quickly joined Stone in proposing
that large corporations be required to organize under a federal law.163 Their book is
a comprehensive indictment of the corporation law developed by states and the
abuses of power which have occurred under that system. Central to their proposal
is the requirement that the board of directors consist of professional directors who
are completely independent from management and elected by the shareholders. 1
Of particular interest for present purposes is their proposal that the federal incor-
159. Originally, two of the fifteen, and later five of the twenty directors of the Union Pacific were appointed by
the President of the United States. The hope was that the presence of the government directors would prevent
monopolistic practices and corporate give-aways, but the corporation discriminated with respect to rates and ac-
cess, concentrated on short run profits, and gave scant attention to the long-run public interest in developing the
West. Government directors could always be outvoted by the other directors. They were viewed as antagonists
and kept in the dark about operations. There was a high rate of turn-over of government directors, and some of
them were inexperienced and knew little about the operation of a railroad.
More detaled accounts of the creation, expectations for, and failure of the undertaking can be found in Sch-
wartz, supra note 158, at 357-61; see also C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 153-57 (1975).
160. Appointments to the office of Alien Property Custodian were governed by political considerations during
the administrations of Presidents Roosevelt, Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy. Those appointees selected di-
rectors for General Aniline on the basis of political considerations. The directors then selected law firms, audi-
tors, and advertising agencies on the basis of politics. For a brief account of the General Aniline history, see M.
EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 168 n. 106 (1976).
161. C. STONE, WHERE THE LAW ENDS 158 (1975).
162. Stone proposed that public directors be nominated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or a spe-
cially established Federal Corporations Commission. They would be permitted to serve only after acceptance by
a majority of the other board members, thus assuring that they would not be viewed as enemies to be frozen out
or ignored by other directors. These measures coupled with the possibility of their removal upon majority vote of
the other directors would constitute protection against blatantly political actions.
He would assure their effectiveness by giving them the rank of the highest grade civil servant, requiring the
corporation to provide them access to corporate records and a separate office and staff to assist in maintaining
awareness of corporate activities and developing problems. STONE, supra note 161, at 152-173.
163. NADER, supra note 62.
164. Id. at 118-28.
1991]
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LA WREVIEW
poration law establish an employee bill of rights, guaranteeing freedom of speech,
rights of privacy, and freedom from discrimination on account of race, religion,
creed, or sex. 165 Such a provision would benefit the growing proportion of the
workforce not represented by unions. It could be supplemented with requirements
that managements engage in collective bargaining and refrain from resisting union
organizing activities. Another possible requirement is that a certain proportion of
the directors be elected by the employees.
The suggestion that corporations be required to have paid public interest direc-
tors was not new with Stone, Nader, Green, nor Seligman. As long ago as 1939,
the late Justice Douglas proposed the establishment of such a corps of directors. 166
Justice Douglas was then primarily concerned with protecting the interests of
stockholders, but he recognized that directors should also think of "the laborer, the
supplier, the purchaser, and the ultimate consumer."167
As indicated above, the view that corporation law should give explicit recogni-
tion to the interests of the work force finds support in the writings of leading aca-
demic scholars of corporation law. As long ago as 1958 Professor Abram Chayes
recommended that corporation law recognize the work force as a constituency en-
titled to participate in corporate governance.168 In 1976 Professor Alfred Conard
suggested that experiments be undertaken with employee representation among
the directors of the largest corporations, relying in part on the previous twenty-
five years experience with codetermination in Germany. 69 Professor Eisenberg,
while persuaded that other modes of recognizing labor's interest in corporate af-
fairs are preferable, acknowledges that labor representation on a board of directors
is "mechanically feasible." 7 Professor Charles Heckscher of the Harvard Busi-
ness School recently reviewed corporate experiences with union representatives
on boards of directors and concluded that, while such partnerships had not pro-
duced extraordinary positive consequences, they, like codetermination in Ger-
many, had not produced disasterous results for management. '71 Application of an
economic analysis to corporate governance led Professor Oliver Williamson to
conclude that employees ought to be able to establish contractual rights and proce-
165. Id. at 180-97.
166. W. Douglas, Corporate Directors, in DEMOCRACY AND FINANCE 46, 52-55 (1939).
167. Id. at 53. Even earlier Herbert Hoover, later to become President, suggested that the problems of the bitu-
minous coal industry were beyond that of an individual operator and that the country would benefit from a system
in which the industry obtained guidance from not only consumers and railways but also from miners. H. Hoover,
Nationalize Power (1920), in AMERICA'S ENERGY 401, 403 (R. Engler ed. 1980).
168. A. Chayes, The Modern Corporation and the Rule of Law, in THE CORPORATION IN MODERN SOCIETY 25,
41-43 (E. Mason ed. 1959). Chayes made his suggestion recognizing that organized labor had been able to make
contributions to corporate governance through collective bargaining, which, borrowing a phrase from Lon
Fuller, he characterized as "the collaborative articulation of a shared purpose." Id. at 42 (citations omitted).
169. A. CONARD, CORPORATIONS IN PERSPECTIVE 365-66 (1976). Conard believes the constituencies of em-
ployees and customers could be given recognition in corporate governance without producing a chaos he predicts
would result from an attempt to resolve the conflicting objectives of ultimate consumers, environmentalists, and
the general public at the board of directors level. Conard, Reflections on Public Interest Directors, 75 MICH. L.
REv. 941,953-56 (1977).
170. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 22-23 (1976).
171. C. HECKSCHER, THE NEw UNIONIsM 118-20, 123 (1988).
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dures adequate to protect their interests. However, recognizing that they might not
always succeed contractually, he also concluded that labor may qualify for repre-
sentation on a board of directors. 172
There are, of course, a considerable number of authorities in the field of corpo-
ration law who disagree and find no need or justification for labor or employee
representation on boards of directors. They include Bayless Manning,173 Detlev
Vagts, 74 N. Wolfson, 17 and Phillip Blumberg. 178 Resolution of the conflict may be
facilitated by reconsideration of the function of the board of directors of a corpora-
tion.
There is a broad agreement among contemporary scholars concerned with cor-
porate governance that, in light of practical realities, boards should consist of
truly independent directors not involved in the management of the corporation, or
that at least a majority should be truly independent directors.177 In recognition of
the fact that today directors do not manage large corporations, their function
should be that of monitoring the actions of the managers, replacing them when ap-
propriate. 17 If the function of the board is limited to monitoring the actions of the
chief executive and other managers who govern operations and make the policy
decisions, presence of union or employee representatives would not create the
conflicts of interests contemplated when the function of the board is viewed as that
of managing and making policy. Union or employee representatives would be able
to direct attention of other board members to management policies or proposed
actions deemed not sufficiently responsive to the interests of employees, but only
with the concurrence of those members would a judgment be passed disapproving
of management policies and actions.
An alternative to requiring employee and other constituency representatives to
be board members of large federally incorporated businesses is that of defining in
the corporation law the collective bargaining obligations of managements. The
mandatory-permissive dichotomy of the National Labor Relations Act could be
172. Professor Williamson did not include unskilled employees or employees with general skills in those enti-
tled to such representation. He believes employee representation on the board has particular justification when
the corporation is experiencing difficulties and asking for give-backs. He also believes that the value of informa-
tion from labor representation may have been underestimated. Williamson, Corporate Governance, 93 YALE L.J.
1197, 1207-09, 1228 (1984).
173. B. Manning, A Taxonomy of Corporate Law Reform, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND
GOvERNANCE 109, 120-22 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979).
174. D. Vagts, The Governance of the Corporation: Reality and Law, in CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERN-
ANCE 159, 163 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979).
175. N. WOLFSON, THE MODERN CORPORATION, Chapter 11 (1984).
176. Blumberg, Reflections on Proposals for Corporate Reform Through Change in the Composition of the Board
of Directors: "Special Interest" or "Public" Directors, 53 B.U.L. REV. 547, 559-64, 567-68 (1973). Professor
Blumberg's reservations arise in part from his observation that there is no union or "grass roots" support for the
proposal of employee representation.
177. B. Manning, A Taxonomy of Corporate Law Reform, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND
GOvERNANCE-THE ALI-ABA SYMPOsIUMs 1977-1978 109, 129-30 (D. Schwartz ed. 1979); M.A. EISENBERG,
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preserved for small employers incorporated under state laws, while establishing
for federally incorporated employers a requirement of bargaining on all issues
deemed by the employee representative to merit discussion and joint determina-
tion. Or a more specific listing of subjects for bargaining could be made, includ-
ing, for example, decisions concerning termination of a business, plant closing,
transfers of operations, termination of product lines, or development of new prod-
ucts or lines of endeavor.
Though the case for a federal corporation law is appealing, such proposals have
been around for a long time but without obtaining much support. They apparently
lack political appeal and they get no support from most of those who have an ex-
pertise and interest in corporation law. Those persons have an investment in pre-
serving the existing system of state incorporation law, either because that expertise
is what leads to consultations and retainers, or because that system serves finan-
cial and business interests better than what can be expected under a federal law.
Few of them have any reason to argue for enactment of a federal incorporation
statute.
However, as demonstrated above, there is ample proof that incumbent manage-
ments have improperly used state corporation laws to protect themselves to the
detriment of stockholders. The Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) will
reach the limits of what it can accomplish with the problems through regulation of
the stock exchanges, and this may lead to a demand for a federal incorporation stat-
ute. The possibilities of such a development will be increased if leveraged buy-
outs made with junk bonds result in bankruptcies or uneconomic
dismemberments to produce cash to avoid bankruptcies.
VIII. AMENDMENT OF THE NLRA
As indicated above, many authorities on corporation law have concluded that
collective bargaining would better serve employee interests than changes in corpo-
ration law, and do so with less adverse effects on the other constituencies of corpo-
rations, particularly shareholders and management.179 Most of these appraisals
were made before it was apparent how narrowly the Supreme Court would cir-
cumscribe the duty of employers to bargain. The appraisals were also made before
the portion of the American work force represented by unions had shrunk to its
present low level. It is now clear that if collective bargaining is to provide protec-
tion for employees from decisions made by employers, particularly managements
of large corporations, the area and subjects encompassed by the duty to bargain
must undergo an enlargement.
The barrier to use of collective bargaining to accomplish the function contem-
plated by corporation law experts has its foundation in the Supreme Court's deci-
179. M. EISENBERG, THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION 23-24, 161-62 (1976); H. Scott, Union Directors
And Fiduciary Duties Under State Corporate Law, in LABOR LAW AND BUSINESS CHANGE 115, 121-25 (1988);
Blumberg, Reflections on Proposals for Corporate Reform Through Change in the Composition of the Board of Di-
rectors: "Special Interest"or "Public"Directors, 53 B.U.L. REV. 547, 571 (1973); Vagts, Reforming the "Modern"
Corporation: Perspectives from Germany, 80 HARV. L. REv. 23, 76-78 (1966).
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sion in the Borg-Warner case."'0 It was in that decision that the Court established
the categories of "mandatory" and "permissive" subjects of bargaining. The deci-
sion received immediate criticism from eminent authorities. 8 ' It adopts an erro-
neous view of collective bargaining.182 Nevertheless, the decision has settled
firmly in place as a fundamental principle of the law of collective bargaining. The
importance for present purposes is the stultifying effect Borg-Warner has had in
barring unions from using collective bargaining to develop solutions to new prob-
lems of employment relations.
In these days when proposals for medical and hospitalization coverage for
spouses and dependents are readily accepted as mandatory subjects, only detached
amusement would be produced by a suggestion that retirement and pension provi-
sions are not a mandatory subject of bargaining because they relate to neither
wages nor conditions of employment but instead concern matters after the work
relationship has been terminated. Yet that was the argument seriously presented
by a major steel company in 1948. 3 Continued adherence to Borg-Warner with a
broad view of management prerogatives will produce results equally as silly and
undesirable as acceptance of that argument would have been. For example, foreign
competition became a serious problem for manufacturing industries only in the
last ten or fifteen years. It has had an effect on wage levels, but more important it
has produced serious problems of job security for American workers because of
plant closures and transfers of operations to non-union and overseas plants. The
180. National Labor Relations Board v. Wooster Div. of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958). Ironically
the decision provided "protection" to a union from an employer's bargaining demands that the collective bargain-
ing agreement contain a clause requiring a vote on its last offer before a strike was called and that the uncertified
local be the signatory to the contract rather than the certified international. The latter demand facially conflicted
with the statutory language establishing the certified union as the bargaining representative and therefore was
properly found to be a violation of the employer's duty to bargain. But it is only facile verbalization that excludes
an opportunity to vote on the acceptability of an employer's last offer before a strike is called from categorization
as a condition affecting employment.
181. Feinsinger, The National Labor Relations Act and Collective Bargaining, 57 MIcH. L. REV. 807, 826-30
(1959); Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court at the October Term 1957, 44 VA. L. REV. 1057, 1074-86 (1958).
A major criticism is that use of the categories of mandatory and permissive subjects misses the trading aspect of
the collective bargaining process. The acceptability of a proposed agreement depends upon what is in the total
package offered, and not upon how individual items have been labeled. A consequence may be inhibition of frank
disclosure of what a party deems important because it is "permissive" and extreme and inflexible demands on
.mandatory" subjects, with a view to obtaining agreement on the "permissive" subject. The significance of a sub-
ject in one industry may be quite different from its significance for another subject, but categorization of subjects
as "mandatory" or "permissive" does not allow for this variation.
182. The assumption that bargaining can take place on a permissive basis might be acceptable if collective bar-
gaining were ajoint search for truth and justice in the employment relationship. It is not. Bargaining takes place in
the force field created by the parties, their interests and desires, and the perceived effectiveness with which they
could make use of economic weapons. What produces agreement is the acceptability of the total package offered
and not merely the acceptability of the proposals for matters characterized as mandatory subjects of bargaining.
The impermissibility of insistence on a permissive subject precludes frank statements of relative priorities for
matters under discussion, and may lead to feigned but unexplained toughness on mandatory items until a protec-
tively disguised message of what is really important had registered.
The danger for a union which attempts to obtain agreement on a permissive subject through such tactics is that it
will be found to have violated its duty to bargain by adamantly insisting on a permissive subject. The risk is that a
strike in support of such a demand will be held to be a serious unfair labor practice, resulting in the loss of the
right of strikers to reinstatement.
183. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247,251-52 (7th Cir. 1948).
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limitations imposed under Borg- Warner on what is properly a subject of collective
bargaining ensures exclusively management decisions rather than the develop-
ment of negotiated solutions for those newly exposed problems.
In the steel industry, both management and the United Steelworkers recog-
nized, after a disasterously long strike in 1959, that customers had turned to for-
eign producers for certainty of uninterrupted supplies. Accordingly, in 1973 they
negotiated a provision of their collective bargaining agreement substituting inter-
est arbitration for resort to strike or lockout if a bargained settlement were not
reached at the termination of the agreement.' 84 Subsequently, insistence by a un-
ion of printing pressmen that such a clause be retained after more than twenty
years of use was held to be a refusal to bargain because such a provision was only a
"permissive" and not a "mandatory" subject of bargaining. 18 The holding was con-
sidered to be applicable to all collective bargaining relationships. The conse-
quence was that the United Steelworkers could not insist that such a clause be
retained in the collective bargaining agreement despite the importance interest ar-
bitration had for job security of employees in the steel industry.
One can only speculate about how many more persons would be employed in
the auto industry if Walter Reuther and the United Auto Workers had been able to
insist upon bargaining about the size of cars the union's members manufactured.
Likewise, one may only speculate about how many more persons would be em-
ployed in the steel industry if United Steel Corporation had to bargain with the
United Steelworkers about its continued reliance on uneconomic open hearth fur-
naces or its decision to invest in the petroleum industry rather than modernization
of its plant. The correct answer in each case would very likely be many thousands
more. That bargaining did not take place because the subjects were permissive,
not mandatory subjects of bargaining.
The uncertainty of whether unions may or may not insist on bargaining about a
decision to terminate an operation for economic reasons other than labor costs188
was probably a factor in bringing about enactment of the 1988 plant closing notifi-
184. Advantages of Experimental Negotiating Pact in Steel, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBooK 1973, 45-46. See also
Appraisal of ENA in Steel Industry, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 1974, 81-82; Steelworkers' 18th Biennial Con-
vention, LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 1976, 231, 233-34. As the declining state of the steel industry created a
climate in which managements could bargain for "give-backs," management negotiators apparently concluded
that the clause did not provide sufficient benefit to justify its inclusion in contracts after expiration of the term for
which it had been established.
185. Columbus Printing Pressmen & Assistant's Union 252, 219 N.L.R.B. 54 (1975), enforced, NLRB v. Co-
lumbus Printing Pressmen, 543 F.2d 1161 (5th Cir. 1976).
186. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals denied enforcement of a Board decision finding a refusal to bargain
about the closure of a plant and transfer of operations to another facility. The Board had concluded there was a
duty to bargain because the decision turned on labor costs. The court concluded that such decision was the exer-
cise of entrepeneurial direction and control which, pursuant to First National Maintenance was not a mandatory
subject of bargaining. Arrow Automotive Indus. v. NLRB, 853 F.2d 223,232 (4th Cir. 1988).
However, a divided NLRB recently held that an employer had violated its duty to bargain when it closed a plant
without bargaining to impasse with the union representing the plant employees because selection of that plant
from those which it operated was based on labor costs and the decision was one which was amenable to solution
through collective bargaining. Reece Johanson dissented because he believed the union had waived its right to
bargain on the issue without deciding whether the decision to close the plant and transfer work elsewhere was a
mandatory subject of bargaining.
[Vol. 11:309
THE MEANINGS OF EMPLOYER
cation statute.187 If unions could have insisted on such bargaining it probably
would have taken place. Provisions adapted to various situations would have been
developed for those relationships in which plant closures or transfers of operations
had become matters of real concern to employees and management. Collective
bargaining could have provided models for dealing with plant closures as it did
with respect to the fringe benefits now enjoyed by many non-union employees.
Many of the inadequacies of the law governing collective bargaining could be
cured by an amendment of section 8(d) of the National Labor Relations Act that
repudiates the mandatory permissive categories of bargaining established by Borg-
Warner. 188 If the claims of small employers are deemed meritorious, the new defi-
nition of the duty to bargain could be made applicable only to employers with a
designated volume of business. The enlargement of NLRB's jurisdiction brought
about by the inflation which has occurred since 1959 suggests the matter deserves
consideration.189 Or the duty to bargain of small employers could be limited in a
manner proposed in 1947 to those matters generally agreed to constitute condi-
tions of employment.' 90
187. Worker Adjustment & Retraining Notification Act, Pub. L. No. 100-379, 102 Stat. 890 (1988) (now cod-
ified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2101-2109 (1988)).
188. The first sentence of section 8(d) could be changed to read:
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the
employer and representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with
respect to wages, hours, terms and conditions of employment, and other matters of importance to either
party ....
The good faith requirement would be applicable in fixing what matters were considered important to a party.
189. In the 1959 Landrum-Griffin Act Congress provided that the NLRB shall not decline to assertjurisdiction
over any labor dispute over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August 1,
1959. 29 U.S.C. § 164(c)(ii). The general non-retail standard then prevailing required only that any employer
sell (or buy) directly or indirectly $50,000 of goods in interstate commerce. Siemons Mailing Service, 122
N.L.R.B. 81 (1958). The general standard for retail concerns required only a gross volume of business of
$500,000. Carolina Supplies & Cement Co., 122 N.L.R.B. 88 (1958).
The inflation which has occurred since 1959 has reduced the value of the dollar to approximately one quarter of
what it was in 1959, thereby extending the mandated jurisdiction to all but very small employers. Statutes since
enacted have used the number of employees of an employer to establish the coverage of those acts. For example,
Title VII of the Civil Rights ACt applies only to employers in an industry affecting commerce who have 15 or
more employees for each working day in each of 20 or more calendar weeks. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b). The 1988
plant closing law applies only to enterprises that employ 100 or more employees. 29 U.S.C. § 2101 (a)(1). The
Age Discrimination in Employment Act applies only to employers who have 20 or more employees in 20 or more
calendar weeks. 29 U.S.C. § 630(b). These later enactments suggest the possibility that the jurisdiction of the
NLRB over employers should be based on the number of employees of an employer.
Of course, the wisdom of such a change in the jurisdiction of the NLRB should turn upon consideration not
only of the burden the Act imposes on small employers but also the protections which that Act provides for those
small employers. See Brown, The Labor-Management Relations Act (LMRA) and Small Business: Should the Act
Be Reformed to Accommodate Small Business, 33 VILL. L. REv. 1073, 1081-82 (1988).
190. A proposal made in the House during consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act would have limited the sub-
jects of bargaining to:
(i) [wiage rates, hours of employment, and work requirements; (ii) procedures and practices relating to
discharge, suspension, lay-off, recall, seniority, and discipline, or to promotion, demotion, transfer and
assignment within the bargaining unit; (iii) conditions, procedures, and practices governing safety, sani-
tation, and protection of health at the place of employment; (iv) vacations and leaves of absence; and (v)
administrative and procedural provisions relating to the foregoing subjects.
H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(11)(1947). This portion of the report is set out in the Supreme Court's
decision in First Nat'l Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666,675 n. 14 (1981). Developments in collective
bargaining since 1947 dictate that such a list would need enlargement to cover fringe benefits, such as medical
and hospital insurance for employees and their dependents.
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For large employers it would be appropriate to expressly reject the right estab-
lished by Darlington Manufacturing Co. to go out of business rather than comply
with the labor policies of the nation. Such an action constitutes an unacceptable
affront to the nation's labor policy. In a similar way the lack of personal involve-
ment of an individual proprietor makes unacceptable the proposition that an em-
ployee should have to risk permanent replacement by participating in an economic
strike. Strikes are a necessary element for the collective bargaining process, and
the policy of the Act is to promote collective bargaining for the purpose of resolv-
ing major new problems which arise in employment.
IX. A REVISED READING OF THE NLRA
Given the present political environment, the amendments of the National La-
bor Relations Act suggested above are not likely to be enacted in the near future.
Also unlikely is the express judicial overruling of leading cases such as Mackay,
Darlington Manufacturing Co., or Borg-Warner. The Court's more recent decision
in First National Maintenance Corp. v. NLRB 1' has an equal importance for the
law of collective bargaining, but it has not settled with all of its implications as a
fixed and determined part of that law.192 Moreover, as will be developed, enact-
ment of the 1988 plant closing notification statute has undermined the rationale of
the decision.
In First National Maintenance, the Supreme Court held that an employer did not
violate its duty to bargain when it decided to shut down part of its business for
purely economic reasons without bargaining with a recently certified union. Man-
agement decisions were said by the Court to fall into three categories. 193 Some,
such as advertising, promotion, product type and design, and financing arrange-
ments, were said to have only an indirect and attenuated effect on the employment
relation. 94 Other decisions, such as the order of succession of lay-offs and recalls,
production quotas, and work rules, were said to be almost exclusively an aspect of
the relationship between the employer and employee. The third category, into
which the employer's action fell, was said to be one having a direct impact on em-
ployment but also akin to that of deciding whether to be in business at all. Textile
191. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
192. The NLRB's first asssessment of First NatI Maintenance was made in United Technologies Otis Elevator,
269 N.L.R.B. No. 162, 115 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 1281 (Apr. 6, 1984). Two Board members thought determina-
tion of whether a matter was a subject of mandatory bargaining depended upon whether the employer's decision
turned on labor costs; the other two participating members thought it depended upon whether the matter was
amenable to resolution through collective bargaining, but did not agree upon how amenability was determined.
In subsequent decisions the Board members have not been able to agree upon the formula for determining when
a matter is a subject of mandatory bargaining. See Reece Corp., 294 N.L.R.B. No. 33, 131 L.R.R.M. (BNA)
1413 (May 31, 1989). See also UFCW v. NLRB, 880 F.2d 1422 (D.C. Cir. 1989), in which the court comments
on the failure of NLRB members to agree on which of the three readings of First Nat7 Maintenance should be
followed. 880 F.2d at 1431-32.
193. 452 U.S. at 676-77.
194. Id. at 677. The experiences of thousands of auto workers and steel workers set out above is to the contrary.
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Workers v. Darlington Manufacturing Co. established that "an employer has the ab-
solute right to terminate his business for any reason he pleases."
195
In view of what the Court assumed to be an employer's need for unencumbered
decision-making, it said "bargaining over management decisions that [had] a sub-
stantial impact on the continued availability of employment should be required
only if the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining
process, outweighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business." 9 The
Court considered the possibilities that "management may have great need for
speed, flexibility, and secrecy in meeting business opportunities and exigen-
cies."1 97 Also noted were the possibilities that management might face significant
tax or securities consequences that hinge on confidentiality, the timing of a plant
closing, or reorganization of the corporate structure. Publicity incident to bargain-
ing might injure the successful transition or increase the economic damage to the
business."19 There is a risk, the Court believed, that labeling the decision manda-
tory might provide a union a powerful tool for achieving delay in a way unrelated to
any feasible solution the union might possess. 199 The Court concluded "the harm
likely to be done to an employer's need to operate freely in deciding whether to
shut down part of its business purely for economic reasons outweigh[ed] the incre-
mental benefit that might be gained through the union's participation in making the
decision," rendering the decision one which was not subject to the duty to bar-
gain.
200
Exactly how broad the Court intended its holding to be is debatable. 21 An ac-
ceptance of the entrepeneurial capitalist as the model for employers is suggested by
its statement "in establishing what issues must be submitted to the process of bar-
gaining, Congress had no expectation that the elected union representative would
become an equal partner in the running of the business enterprise in which the un-
ion's members are employed. 20 2 The Court did, however, state that it was intimat-
195. 452 U.S. at 677 (emphasis added).
196. Id. at 679. The scales seem weighted in favor of employers if only whatever are the abstract concepts of
labor management relations and the collective bargaining process are weighed against the burden on the em-
ployer. A more fair and proper balancing would seem to require weighing the interests of the employees and the
affected public against the burden placed on the business.
197. 452 U.S. at 682-83.
198. Id. at 683.
199. Id. The example used is presented in Comment, "Partial Tenninations"-A Choice Between Bargaining
Equality and Economic Efficiency, 14 UCLA L. REv. 1089, 1103-05 (1967). The comment suggests that a union
might, by threatening a strike in other portions of an employer's operations, force the employer to keep capital
inefficiently invested in a failing enterprise to the long-run disadvantage of both the employer and the employees.
200. 452 U.S. 666,686 (1981).
201. Statement of the conclusion in terms of an employer's need to operate freely rather than the employer's
need indicates the holding was to constitute a ruling applicable to all economic decisions to shut down part of a
business. But, inconsistent with such a reading, the Court concluded by reviewing the specific facts of the case
"to illustrate the limits of [the] holding." 452 U.S. at 687. Included in those facts was that the union had no con-
trol or authority over the fee which the employer was to receive from the customer. Directing attention to the facts
of the case suggests a holding limited by those facts. However, the final observation was that the decision to halt
work was not unlike opening a new line of business or going out of business entirely, and this suggests that the
court formulated a rule for all economically motivated decisions to terminate operations.
202. 452 U.S. at 676.
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ing "no view as to other types of management decisions, such as a plant relocation,
sales, other kinds of subcontracting, automation, etc., which are to be considered
on their particular facts."2 3 Elsewhere the Court noted that the subjects over
which mandatory bargaining has been required have changed over time.24 And it
reaffirmed an earlier statement that Congress deliberately left the words "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" without definition because
it did not intend to deprive the NLRB of the power further to define those terms in
light of specific industrial practices.2"5 In doing so, it quoted with apparent ap-
proval a statement in the Conference Report on the Taft Hartley Act:
The appropriate scope of collective bargaining cannot be determined by a formula;
it will inevitably depend upon the traditions of an industry, the social and political
climate at any given time, the needs of employers and employees, and many related
factors. What are proper subject matters for collective bargaining should be left in
the first instance to employers and trade-unions, and in the second place, to any ad-
ministrative agency skilled in the field and competent to devote the necessary time to
a study of industrial practices and traditions in each industry or area of the country,
subject to review by the courts. It cannot and should not be strait-jacketed by legisla-
tive enactments.206
The Court's analysis of the needs of a company's management in deciding
whether to terminate a portion of its business is a judicial creation. It certainly is
not found in the statute, and it was set forth in the opinion without citation to em-
pirical data or economic studies exploring the effect of publicity on such
actions.2t7 The Court's surmise about what policy will best serve the interests of
the country has only a questionable acceptability. It was developed in the absence
of a more authoritative and representative guide as to how much the interests of
employers, employees, and the public should weigh against management's interest
in unencumbered decision-making.
Congressional enactment of the 1988 plant closing law2 8 has provided such a
guide. Certainly its enactment also constitutes an important part of "the social and
political climate" within the meaning of the Conference Report on the Taft Hartley
Act which the Court said was to be given weight in determining the scope of col-
lective bargaining under the NLRA.
The plant closing law requires enterprises employing 100 or more employees to
give sixty days notice of job losses to be imposed at any single site by plant closing
during any thirty-day period. Notices must also be given for any mass layoff,
which is defined to include an employment loss at a single site during any thirty-
day period of 33 % of the employees and at least fifty employees. The notice must
203. Id. at 686 n.22.
204. Id. at 679 n.18.
205. Id. at 675.
206. 452 U.S. at 676 n. 14, quoting from H.R. CONF. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., Ist Sess. 34-35 (1947).
207. The Court did however cite instances where unions had aided employers in saving failing businesses. 452
U.S. at 681 n.19.
208. See supra note 187.
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be given to each representative of the affected employees, or, if there is no repre-
sentative, to each individual employee. The notice must also be given to local gov-
ernment. In the case of a sale of part or all of an employer's business, the seller
shall be responsible for providing any notice of plant closing or mass layoff up to
the effective date of the sale, and purchasers are responsible for such notices after
the effective date of the sale. This provision may force a seller to obtain informa-
tion concerning the buyer's plans concerning employment. An exception does ex-
ist for layoffs caused by circumstances that were not reasonably foreseeable as of
the time notices would have been required.
Notices to employee representatives or employees will almost certainly become
notices to all customers, competitors, creditors, and others, destroying the confi-
dentiality which the Court was willing to assume was so essential to an employer's
decisional process. The sixty-day notice is required despite the Court's hypothe-
sized need for speed, flexibility, and secrecy in meeting business opportunities
and exigencies. The Congressional assessment was that generally such notices can
and should be given despite the publicity certain to result. Congress thereby gave
greater weight to the interests of employees, their representatives, and the com-
munity than the interest of employers in speed and confidentiality. And more than
a year after the Act became effective there was no evidence that it had caused se-
vere problems for employers. 209
Nine state legislatures have also enacted statutes requiring employers to give
notices of plant closings or relocations. 210 Some of the state statutes apply to rela-
tively small businesses with only fifty or more employees. 211 State statutes do not
have the same relevance for determining the scope of bargaining under the NLRA
as does the federal law. But they are of significance in establishing that the interest
of employees in the future of their employment deserves protection and that the
hazards or publicity and the burden imposed on an employer's decision making do
not outweigh the employees' interest in getting notice and an opportunity to plan.
In most instances an employer that can give sixty days notice of a plant closing to
the representative of its employees will also be able to engage in collective bargain-
ing with that representative about whether that closing can be avoided.
It is important to remember, as the Supreme Court recognized in First National
Maintenance,2 12 that the duty to bargain does not require an employer to reach
agreement with the employees' bargaining representative. Absent a requirement of
209. Warn Law's Impact Limited, 133 Lab. Rel. Rep. 443 (BNA New and Background Information)(April 9,
1990).
210. [9A Indiv. Empl. Rights Manual] Lab. Re. Rep. (BNA) 507:101 (1991).
211. E.g., HAW. RFv. STAT. § 394B-2 (Supp. 1990); id. at 394B-2, Act 377, L. 1987; MD. CODE ANN. § 206E
(B to D), ch. 147, L. 1985; MAss. GEN. L. ch. 151A, § 71A (1991); TENN. CoDE ANN. tit. 50, § 2(a), as
amended by ch. 997, L. 1988; Wis. STAT ANN. § 109.07(l)(d) (West Supp. 1990). The Michigan plant closing
law applies to the closing of establishments with only twenty-five employees, but provides only that those estab-
lishments be encouraged to give notices of their decisions as early as possible. MICH. COMP. LAwS ANN. §
450.732 (West 1990). South Carolina's law requires two weeks notice by all employers who require an employee
to give notice of intention to terminate employment. S.C. CODE ANN. § 41-1-40 (Law. Co-op. 1986).
212. 452 U.S. at 678 n. 16.
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the union's agreement, there is no need to fear that a requirement of bargaining
will make unions equal partners with employers. Indeed, the bargaining power of
a union generally will be greatly reduced if the employer's economic analysis pro-
vides a substantial basis for the conclusion that it should go out of business.
Enactment of the 1988 plant closing law has destroyed the rationale of the
Court's opinion in First National Maintenance. This development provides an oc-
casion for reconsideration of what is required of employers by the NLRA, primar-
ily with respect to the duty to bargain but also with respect to other provisions of
the Act.213 In making the assessment of what benefits may be obtained and what
obligations may appropriately be imposed, the Board and the Court should pro-
ceed with a realistic understanding of what kinds of employers provide most of the
employment in the United States. If the statute remains unchanged and the rulings
are to be applied to all employers, the assumption made in assessing the burdens
on employers should not be that they are individual entrepeneurs who personally
created and maintained the occasion for the employment. The assessment should
be made and the rules should be formulated with an awareness that, generally
speaking, employees constitute a constituency deserving at least a hearing in the
governance of corporations, and that hearing can be provided by enlarging the
scope of the duty to bargain.
213. In undertaking that reconsideration, attention should be given the fact that section 7 of the Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 157 (1988), establishes the right of employees to engage in concerted activities not only "for the purposes of
collective bargaining" but also for "other mutual aid or protection." That language suggests that employees may
seek to establish other mutual aid or protection beyond that achievable as subjects of collective bargaining.
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